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Abstract
This thesis studies affliction as it appears in the proto-avant-garde art movement of Dada.
I analyse affliction through the theoretical frameworks of the ‘neuronal’ and
‘immunological,’ as presented by cultural theorist Byung-Chul Han in The Burnout
Society (2015). By applying Han’s theories to Dada, I challenge Han’s argument that our
affliction underwent a shift at the end of the Cold War: No longer produced by negativity
(the immunological), affliction is now produced by excess positivity (the neuronal). Such
excess blocks our access to and erodes the existence of ‘somewhere else,’ causing a crisis
in the arts, which I argue should be attributed to neuronal affliction and traced back to
Dada. Their response to World War I, both in content to some extent but particularly in
method, during a period of globalization, alliances and rapidly changing technology and
beliefs displays many features of neuronal affliction. Hence, the refusal, nihilism and
negativity Dada has so often been characterized by in the past are misunderstandings of
its inventive and playfully excessive methodologies. The aforementioned thesis is
explored through the ‘bacteriological’ in Tristan Tzara’s “Dada Manifesto 1918,” the
collage’s hybrid nature and the power of tiredness in Max Ernst’s Murdering Airplane
(1920), and the positivity of Marcel Duchamp’s ‘possiblism,’ as it appears in his
readymade artwork, Fountain (1917).

Keywords
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Summary for Lay Audience
This thesis studies affliction as it appears in the proto-avant-garde art movement, Dada. I
analyse affliction through the theoretical frameworks of the ‘neuronal’ and
‘immunological,’ as presented by cultural theorist Byung-Chul Han in The Burnout
Society. The ‘immunological’ is an age or paradigm defined by a vital tension between
positive and negative, Self and Other. Han repeatedly claims that this mode, heavily
inclined toward conflict, was a particularly strong defining feature of the twentieth
century. In contrast, the ‘neuronal’ is an age unable to manage negativity as it
progressively becomes more ‘positive,’ prioritizing speed, freedom, transparency,
smoothness, amounting to more information and faster exchanges of capital. Han argues
that we have become so fixated on these issues that we are unable to see they are the
sources of our contemporary afflictions. We no longer have a problem of too little, but of
too much. Our pain is not imposed on us from the Other, but by ourselves as we
perpetually try to achieve more and rest less. Consequently, neuronal affliction is defined
by hyperactivity, burnout and depression, all produced by excess positivity.
By applying Han’s theories to Dada, I challenge Han’s argument that our
affliction underwent a shift at the end of the Cold War. This problematizes Han’s hard,
dualist split between the two modes of affliction. It also positions neuronal affliction as
not strictly the product of digital technology and neoliberal capitalism, but more broadly
a quality of being ‘modern,’ suggesting that Dada may have important lessons for our
contemporary world. I argue that the Dadaists were responding to this new neuronal
affliction as early as World War I, a period of globalization, alliances and rapidly
changing technology and beliefs. Hence, the refusal, nihilism and negativity Dada has so
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often been characterized by in the past are misunderstandings of its inventive and
playfully excessive methodologies. The aforementioned thesis is explored through the
‘bacteriological’ in Tristan Tzara’s “Dada Manifesto 1918,” the collage’s hybrid nature
and the power of tiredness in Max Ernst’s Murdering Airplane (1920), and the positivity
of Marcel Duchamp’s ‘possiblism’ as it appears in his readymade artwork, Fountain.
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Introduction
In New Studies in Dada Richard Sheppard’s opening sentence acknowledges that “until
quite recently, a fair understanding of Dada was made difficult by the pervasiveness of
the view that it was a purely negative phenomenon” (Sheppard 3). In the view of many
art historians and cultural theorists Dada was nihilistic buffoonery that flew in the face of
the tragedy of World War I or childish tantrums unworthy of notice. Nearly forty years
later, Dada has become the crux of modernism, but it is still viewed as negative: as an
anti-art, nihilism or refusal. Dada’s profoundly different set of assumptions, which value
irrationality, chance and so-called ‘anti’ human or machinic perspectives over rational
human projects are rarely discussed outside of opposition, conflict and negation.
Sheppard nearly escaped this way of thinking when he said, “all forms of Dada
proclaimed a dialectical attitude which says ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ simultaneously, and the mix
between the positive and negative ingredients varied from person to person and place to
place” (Sheppard 8). Yet, the simultaneity of Dada’s ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ is not dialectically
opposed. Instead, it is an additive ‘and… and… and,’ playfully mutating what was once
distinct into something beyond rational understanding. As a result, it is best to consider
Dada’s simultaneity as an ‘and’ that accumulates and hybridizes while escaping a linear
calculation that simply ‘adds up.’ The rapidly globalizing industrial era of Dada, like
today, was accruing more and more sensations, identities, representations, technologies,
alliances and opinions that, I argue, became too much, producing a simulation of
‘negativity’ that functions in an entirely different way than a ‘dialectical attitude.’ This is
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a key feature of what cultural theorist Byung-Chul Han describes as a new paradigm
defined by an affliction of excess positivity.
In the opening chapter of The Burnout Society (2015) Han identifies two ages
defined by affliction. Our current one, the neuronal age, is pained by its excesses and
inability to manage negativity while the previous age, the immunological, is cast as an
opposition between positive and negative features. It is best to describe these two ages
beginning with the immunological. As a combative paradigm, it is defined by division.
On one side there is the Self, on the Other there is the Other. The immunological orients
itself around the opposition to the Other, similar to the way the body resists bacterial and
viral infections. The immunological is a battleground for survival, always defending
against the Other’s advances while seeking immunity. It contains an inherent
understanding of inside and outside, safe and dangerous, positive and negative. The
neuronal, on the other hand, is a purely positive paradigm that cannot manage negativity
or the Other. It does not recognize the Other’s advances, nor does it organize itself in
relation to negativity. The neuronal has effectively outsmarted the immunological. It has
succeeded at immunity—at least theoretically. Because the neuronal age is no longer
primarily afflicted by external forces, the source of its pain is now internalized. External
sources of suffering are identifiable, manageable and preventable. The neuronal, by
contrast, places pressure on our organization, attention and will, that is, it emphasizes the
mind rather than the body. Our contemporary afflictions are no longer caused by
trespasses of the Other, as with infection; rather, they are composed of excess positivity
and an absence of negativity. Whereas before we might bleed out from wounds, we now
fear heart attacks created by blood clots, an affliction we are repeatedly told is caused by
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poor choices. Threats such as clots are not defended against in the moment so much as
managed over time. In this way, we suffer from “psychic disturbances such as
exhaustion, fatigue, and depression—all of which are to be traced back to the excess of
positivity” (The Transparency Society 6). This is to say that we suffer from too much of
ourselves. We are afflicted by systemic, long term, repetitive mistakes in our care for our
own bodies and heath rather than sudden ruptures of the Other. We trip over ourselves as
we scramble to reach where we already are, burning out from hyperactivity rather than
immunizing against the threat of the Other.
This thesis argues that what Han calls the “crisis of fantasy in literature and the
arts” originates from this shift between the immunological and the neuronal and,
importantly, this begins with Dada (The Agony of Eros 41). The Dadaists, appalled by the
First World War, considered rational thought to be at the centre of their new suffering. As
Tristan Tzara says in his “Dada Manifesto 1918,” “logic imprisoned by the senses is an
organic disease.” That is, logic at work within the human would only serve to lead us to
our downfall. “Science says we are the servants of nature: everything is in order, make
love and bash your brains in” (Tzara 39). In Tzara’s view, science as a manifestation of
logical thought describes strict systems that lead us to dialectical relations with which we
bond and ultimately destroy. It was not the actual wounds of ‘bashing our brains in’
during the Great War that had significant impact on individuals, but the systemic
problems produced by reason and the subsequent depression of being ‘imprisoned’ inside
those systems. Austria-Hungry’s war with Serbia, caused by the assassination of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, spread beyond the two nations, expanding along a web of
allegiances creating two coalitions: the Triple Entente (France, Russia and Britain) and
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the Triple Alliance (Austria-Hungry and Italy). In this way, the suffering of World War I
is found primarily in an additive chain-reaction of ‘ands’ that drew the world into war,
not in the conflict itself.
Depression and exhaustion abounded in the trenches where soldiers were at work
going nowhere, far from home, seemingly a world away. As one of Marcel Duchamp’s
brothers, Raymond Duchamp-Villon, noted in a letter he wrote while serving in a medical
unit near Paris, “We are as far away from Paris, where some friends are working now, as
from New York” (Hamilton and Agee 119). Similarly, the reality of being injured in the
field was exhausting and a cause for depression. “It could take four hours to carry an
injured man half a mile and, being upright and close together, helpers were easy targets
even for erratic gunfire. The result was that thousands of men fought and died in
quagmires of mud, sewage and decaying corpses beneath the menaces of bombing and
gassing. Compounding their misery, sleep was almost impossible” (Wright 82). The tense
psychology of soldiers, medics as well as the general civilian population was
compounded by their exhaustion. George Grosz captured the exhaustion and machinic
disfunction of the soldier as well as society at large in his poem Kaffeehaus (1918) when
he says, “I am a machine whose pressure gauge has gone to pieces! And all the cylinders
run in a circle.”1 As Brigid Doherty beautifully explains in her inspiring text “See: We
are all Neurasthenics!,” “the circular pattern of the parts in motion indicates a machine
out of control, an engine running hot but exhausted, as though driven through the paces
of madness rather than those of production. The pathology of the machine thus described
is internal. To repeat, a pressure gauge has blown, and the parts spinning inside do not
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Translated by Brigid Doherty (95).
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know how or when to stop” (97). The exhaustion expressed both literally, visually and
methodologically in the Dadaists is what I particularly want to focus on as it contrasts the
jovial energy, noise, and “refusal” Dada is often characterized with, in other words, its
negativity.2 Although World War I was not necessarily the beginning of the neuronal age
for Han, it certainly appears to be the outbreak. This is an important distinction to make
as the Dadaists were not expressing a purely neuronal form, but a simultaneous merger of
the immunological and the neuronal, as seen in their characteristic ‘Yes’ and ‘No,’ which
simultaneously holds multiple possibilities.
The contagious psychology of Dada repositions or stretches the decline of the
immunological and rise of the neuronal back some 70 years from Han’s original
proposition. “Indeed, the immunological paradigm of the last century was commanded by
the vocabulary of the Cold War, an altogether military dispositive” (The Burnout Society
1). However, the militaristic events of the twentieth century do not preclude the
development of different expressions. Han has overlooked the slow emergence of the
neuronal throughout the twentieth century, beginning with Dada as an expression of
affliction that escaped traditional, immunological explanation. The new methodologies of
Dada, such as collage, chance and simultaneity, are explorations of the new, neuronal,
excess positivity. I argue, this is a reason why Dada was still so misunderstood even in
the late 70s and early 80s when Sheppard was compiling his book. Although Dada
describes a modernizing world and psychology, many of the key figures, such as Marcel
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In an interview with James Johnson Sweeny for NBC in 1956, Duchamp commented,
“Dada was no longer concerned with the plastic arts properly speaking, it wasn’t
interested in questions of technique or with the movements before it. It was more
interested in literature. In fact, it was negative, a total refusal” (Essential Writings 135).
5

Duchamp and Max Ernst, appear to have found ways to escape neuronal affliction
affecting us today, as Han describes it. Extending the presence of the neuronal to the
beginning of the twentieth century problematizes Han’s frequent claim that it was
particularly saturated by the immunological. Adjusting the inception of the neuronal age
back to the First World War not only weakens neuronal affliction’s dependency on digital
technology and neoliberal capitalism but it also positions Dada as a kind of premonition
of them, or at least some of their consequences. Here a question arises of whether the
‘military dispositive’ Han applies to the last century was caused by a mounting
aggression toward the Other or a destabilizing amount of choice and responsibility for
ourselves and for nature amidst rapid industrialization and change. Reading Han and
Dada together provides a better understanding of how affliction in both immunological
and neuronal modalities function together rather than what Han presents as a dualist split
between the two.
This thesis opens new scholarly possibilities by bringing Han’s work on affliction
in relation with Dada as a site for the initial ‘crisis in the arts.’ I have developed three
essays, each looking at different Dadaists who played significant roles in the movement
while investigating how exhaustion and fantasy appear in their work. The first essay takes
Tristan Tzara’s “Dada Manifesto 1918” as its focus, exploring the Dadaist tendency to
use ‘bacteriological’ language to explain the new form of neuronal affliction. Here, I
further develop Han’s reason for distinguishing between ‘immunological’ and ‘neuronal’
modes by theorizing the consequences of including dangerous qualities within the Self: it
is exhausting. Exhaustion is a key feature of Han’s ‘Burnout Society.’ It leaves no room
for relaxation, contemplation or fantasy. The second essay offers Han’s conception of a
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‘tired vision’ to develop an unwritten ‘neuronal optics’ to accompany his ‘immunological
optics,’ which cloud our capability to see beyond a relationship of “attack and defense”
(The Burnout Society 1). Max Ernst’s collage Murdering Airplane (1920) helps to explain
these optics as it displays immunological traits as well as neuronal ones. Upon the
application of my conception of a ‘neuronal optics,’ Murdering Airplane acts as a
perceptual pivot for two fundamentally different afflictions caused by our subjective
perception. The third and final essay turns to Marcel Duchamp’s notion of ‘possibility’ as
a key component in Han’s neuronal affliction, produced by an all-encompassing Self that
fundamentally is unable to completely accept the negativity of impossibility. This is
developed further with the initial reception of the readymade artwork Fountain (1917),
which describes a meeting of immunological limits and the new form of neuronal
expression. The ‘no jury’ system the Society of Independent Artists attempted to employ
in 1917 assumed that the artwork submitted to their exhibition would fall under their preexisting ‘immunological’ expectations of art. Duchamp’s submission of a urinal as
artwork not only disrupted this assumption, but posed exhausting philosophical problems
artists and theorists are still navigating today. Together, these three essays explore the
problem of exhausted fantasies and the Dadaists unique way of playing around it.
Today, our inability to imagine alternatives has become a serious problem.
Bringing Han’s theory of affliction into contact with Dada follows the trajectory of the
last few decades while considering Dada as a significant critical intervention in art
history. I claim that Dada, its relationship to Otherness and its unique way of seeing the
world is not only an important critical reaction to early twentieth century problems but
also to early twenty-first century problems as well. The relationship between Han and
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Dada is an as of yet unexplored area of research, at least in the English-speaking world.
Similarly, a mixture of the immunological and neuronal modalities does not exist in
Han’s writing and merits exploration. Exploring these connections and others like it is an
important contribution to Hanian and Dada scholarship as Han’s proposed paradigm shift
pivots on modernism, a flexible, if not wholly ambiguous, term. One way that Han’s
‘paradigms’ have impacted my understanding of modernism is that the immunological
and neuronal are more than modes of affliction. They acknowledge pain and its
avoidance (or attraction) as the motor that drives behaviour, decision making and our
ability to imagine alternatives in (post)modern society.
I could not have arrived at this understanding without drawing connections
between the neuronal and Dada, which expressed a new relation to dogmatically accepted
modernist values, like reason, that have heavily influenced art and culture ever since.
This has curiously positioned Dada at both the beginning and (supposed) end of
modernism. Their unique positioning in the margins of both immunological and neuronal
ages also suggests that the misattributions of negativity to Dada may contain suggestions
for how to cope or adjust to a new age with new problems. In this light, nihilism and
buffoonery appear quite similar to the optimism or naïveté of children’s play. Can we
really continue to think of Dada as negative in this way? When Han claims there is a
‘crisis in the arts’ it then becomes a symptom of a different crisis, one of identifying our
affliction. Without an understanding of our affliction we experience exhausting difficulty
in imagining even the most basic fantasies and alternatives to our current problems. In
sum, this thesis argues that the problem of the neuronal age was already being critiqued
by Dadaists at the beginning of the twentieth century and our lack of relationship to
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negativity and the Other make imagining somewhere else impossible because of an
oppositional, calculating, rational perception. This new contribution to Dada scholarship
suggests its trademark negativity is a misunderstanding of a new ‘logic,’ for lack of better
term (still), composed of excess positivity, which is not only just as harmful, but all the
more so on account of its invisibility to the immunological optics we employ. As Han has
begun to explain, our afflictions are no longer produced (primarily) by the Other. As
Dada has attempted to express, our new afflictions are easily understood as just nihilism
and nonsense. As I will argue in the following pages, considering the manner in which
we perceive dangers and possibilities is the first step toward, as Han would say,
somewhere else.

9

Exhausting Fantasies of Somewhere Else: A Mixture of the Safe and Dangerous
In The Agony of Eros (2017) Byung-Chul Han claims that we are facing a “crisis of
fantasy” driven by the dissipation of hard thresholds between the Self and Other (41).
Han’s specific reasoning for this claim will be explored in the next chapter. Here, our
concern lies with expressions of this crisis in the form of what Han refers to as the
‘neuronal.’ The neuronal is a positive paradigm that lacks recognition of negativity and
the Other. Our contemporary afflictions are no longer caused by trespasses of the Other.
Rather, they are composed of excess positivity and an absence of negativity. This
manifests as “psychic infarctions” such as hyperactivity, burnout and depression (The
Burnout Society 6). We can imagine excess as a blood clot in which affliction does not
stem from external incursions like a wound or infection created against our will, but as
the build-up of our own accumulation. Crucially, the ‘clotting’ of neuronal affliction, or
psychic infarctions, is produced by recurrent, systemic behaviour, particularly of our
conscious choices. Sudden ruptures or infections, on the other hand, is what Han refers to
as ‘immunological affliction,’ in which our suffering is caused by the Other—or other
than the Self and against the Self’s wishes. The consequence of shifting affliction to a
neuronal modality is that the Self, the body and the mind, become simultaneously
dangerous and safe, laced with Otherness. Fantasy, then, becomes a failed escape from
our ailments, not only because these ailments are in us but particularly because fantasy
comes from our mind now ‘sick’ with immanent dangers that clot an imagining of
somewhere else.
Contrary to Han’s theorizing that this turn occurred late in the twentieth century,
early twentieth century artists from the Dada ‘movement’ used the vocabulary of
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immunology, though its methodologies were neuronal. This results in a comingling of
two always-present modes. On the one hand, there is the immunological mode based in
conflict between the Self and Other, inside and outside, safe and dangerous and, on the
other hand, the neuronal mode afflicts itself with too much. What follows is a
consideration of: how Han developed his terms for affliction in relation to immunology; a
direct application of that reasoning to the artwork Murdering Airplane (1920) by Max
Ernst; how the ‘crisis of fantasy’ is a concern Marcel Duchamp addressed with his first
readymade In Advance of a Broken Arm (1917); how the ‘negativity’ Dada is perpetually
inscribed with is a misunderstanding of Dada’s use of Kantian indifference; and how the
judgements Dada makes of its contemporaneous world are not of the Other, but of
themselves, the failings of the human race and its politics leading to debilitating,
unshakable exhaustion.

Including Nasty Aggregates
Infectious language is used frequently in Dada writings and artwork. We find this in Max
Ernst’s “The Old Vivisectionist,” Raoul Hausmann’s “Put Your Money in dada!” and
Tristan Tzara’s “Dada is a Virgin Germ,” just to name a few instances of writing.3 Tzara
also makes reference to the ‘bacteriological’ affects of Dada in his “Dada Manifesto
1918,” appearing quite fond of the recurring imagery of rats and their pestilence.
“Plague,” “spores,” “cells” and other such terms illustrate the atmosphere of that time
from the critical perspective of Dada, as George Grosz and Wieland Hertzfelde said,
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Notably, Ernst also made a collage with overpainting that emphasizes his interest in
infection and cells, The Gramineous Bicycle Garnished with Bells the Dappled Fire
Damps and the Echinoderms Bending the Spine to Look for Caresses (1920).
11

something was “floating in the air” (Grosz and Hertzfelde 468). Expressions of this sort
were used frequently to acknowledge the nearly simultaneous emergence of this likeminded international movement of Dadas and the collaborations between them. The
individual cells of Dada, notably in Zurich, Berlin and Paris, were plagued by the chaos
of war. Struck dumb by the destruction of opposition, the antibodies of society’s immune
system had failed, miserably; leaving such a gaping, infected wound that cacophony and
catharsis seemed as reasonable a remedy as medicine itself. Suturing together rotten
components of society was an idea reminiscent of Frankenstein’s monster, a reference the
Dadaists would likely have enjoyed due to their interest in machine-human hybrids and
collage, topics to be explored in the following pages. The activities of Dada dissolved the
distinctions between art and life, intention and chance, Own and Other in a mimicry of
the First World War. This is a significant moment in which a new paradigm begins to
emerge. The technologies of defence and immunity falter under the global political
alliances that caused the war. This was a new logic of inclusion rather than opposition,
opening an opportunity not to fight the rot so much as assimilate it—or even become it.
Curiously, this is not when Han identifies the emergence of the neuronal. For him, the
neuronal is a contemporary form of affliction.
“Every age has its signature afflictions,” Han tells us (The Burnout Society 1).
According to Roberto Esposito what afflicts us is still immunological. In his words,
“what remains constant is the place where the threat is located, always on the border
between the inside and the outside, between the self and other, the individual and the
common” (Esposito 2). This is what he calls the “immunitary paradigm,” linking the
disparate phenomena that cause our suffering and structure our behaviour. It seems
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exceptionally likely this is where Han took his own paradigmatic shift from as both
theorists defining their respective ‘immunological’ and ‘immunitary’ paradigms do so in
very similar ways. “What frightens us today is not contamination per se—which has been
viewed as inevitable for some time now—as much as its uncontrolled and unstoppable
diffusion throughout all the productive nerve centers of our lives” (Esposito 2-3).
Because of this shift away from ‘contamination’ toward ‘nerve centers’ and because “it is
practically coextensive with the space,” Han diverges from Esposito (Esposito 3).
“Esposito’s immunological analysis does not address contemporary problems, but only
ones from the past” (The Burnout Society 3). In the past, these afflictions have been
bacterial and viral, which the immune system opposes. Now, Han argues, we suffer from
neurological disorders such as depression, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,
borderline personality disorder, and burnout. The immune system is not only unable to
deal with these disorders; it can aggravate them by mistaking the chronic grind of modern
life with the short, but vital, response to a predator or infection. What we suffer from
today is “not infections, but infarctions” (The Burnout Society 1). Importantly, Han
makes this distinction through immunologist Polly Matzinger’s work on ‘useful’ and
‘dangerous’ cells.4 For Han, this paper’s publication pairs the end of the immunological
age with the end of the Cold War; within the thirteen-year period of Matzinger’s research
from 1994 to its publication in 2007.

See the first endnote in The Burnout Society: “a paradigm shift occurred within medical
immunology at the end of the Cold War. In America, Polly Matzinger discarded the
immunological model of preceding decades. According to her model, the immune system
does not distinguish between ‘self’ and ‘non-self,’ i.e. domestic and foreign, but between
‘friendly’ and ‘dangerous’” (53).
4
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Matzinger argues the existing model for immune response is overly simplistic, in
which there is a mistaking of chemical changes within tissue as a response to external
stimulus. This overlooks the possibility of changes occurring for interior purposes.
Matzinger adapted her theories on immunology not only to include varied processes of
immunity but repair as well. This is a significant theoretical shift as it recognizes
stimulation can originate from and be responded to within what is one’s Own, not
necessarily extending to a relation with the Other. Thus “the ultimate control lies with the
tissues in which the response occurs, rather than with the pathogen against which it is
directed” (Matzinger 12). Here, behaviour is no longer strictly governed by opposition. It
is “not tolerance or suppression. It is simply a switch of effector class” (Matzinger 13).
From this perspective Han’s conception of the neuronal begins to emerge. Changes that
can and have been measured in terms of conflict are potentially simplistic
misunderstandings of the complexity found in all possible actions available to tissue
cells.
Complex relationships to stimulus not only present questions of how a cell is
interacting, but what ‘effector class’ is operating. Each one of these classes are part of a
larger body operating with far more complexity than binary opposition to pathogens or
the Other, as Matzinger points out in relation to water:
Because life evolved in water, the hydrophobic portions (‘Hyppos’) of molecules
are both useful and dangerous: useful because hydrophobic interactions hold
membranes together, mold the shape of complex proteins and so on; dangerous
because exposed Hyppos aggregate non-specifically to form nasty aggregates.
(Matzinger 11)
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In this example, water is both ‘useful’ and ‘dangerous’ to cells, implying that within an
immunological framework what is dangerous is also useless. Immunological danger is an
element of the Other that cannot be controlled, used, or understood. Absorbing the
distinction of ‘dangerous’ into ‘useful’ occurs for Matzinger through a recognition of the
cell as composed of multiple parts with different functions. Each part, therefore, makes
use of, and are threatened by, different elements. This transition to a neuronal form of
relating recognizes a previously unacknowledged complexity and ambiguity between the
Self and the Other making ‘danger’ a relative and fluctuating term. Fluctuating
identifications of ‘useful’ and ‘dangerous’ is, then, a subtler conversation about threats,
which are not necessarily malign or foreign, dissolving the central logic of the
immunological by accepting aspects of danger rather than immunizing against it. Danger
is no longer imposed upon the Self by the Other, an affliction it must immunize against,
rather it is an omnipresent quality of life we must live with.
In Max Ernst’s Murdering Airplane (1920) we see multiple images living with
one another in a single collage. The collage depicts a black and white World War I era
biplane that appears to be hatching the yellowed arms of a catalogue model or perhaps a
Grecian nude statue in mid-flight. Its front portion is without a propeller, worming its
way through the sky. A strangely weightless dance, as though it were dreaming. In the
bottom right corner two soldiers carry an amputee, without his lower legs, out of frame.
And in the background is a desolate expanse of grey. Once separate images now share
their representations in a collaborative effort to produce a new image. Each portion of the
collage is delineated by the cut edge of the picture-fragment, clearly marking out
different sources Ernst gathered from. However, this new composite image is viewed as a
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single piece by way of the picture-fragments living with one another on the same picture
plane. The boundaries between the fragmented parts of the collage are, in effect,
permeable. They share aspects of themselves. They are different while lacking Otherness.
For Han, “such difference lacks the sting of foreignness, as it were, which would provoke
a strong immunoreaction” (The Burnout Society 2). The immune response, here, is to
remove the dangerous Other from the Self but this does not appear in collage. The
constituent parts of collage do not seek to remove Otherness; the image thrives on the
disjunction. The different pieces of a collage are its language, a contagious one at that, as
fragments of different pictures unite to create a new hybrid. This is an additive process,
the same as Dr. Frankenstein used on body parts. Of course, elements of the original
images are lost, cut away, but the conversation of collage incorporates this negativity.
The danger of loss is glossed over through the positive act of creating something new.
‘Positivizing’ the loss of its previous parts, the collage becomes a hybrid just as
Murdering Airplane is a hybrid—part human and part machine.
Hybridity, in this way, is reminiscent of the relation Jacques Derrida attributes to
Emmanuel Levinas. According to Derrida, Levinas’ philosophy is defined by hospitality;
“Although the word is neither frequently used nor emphasized within it, Totality and
Infinity bequeaths to us an immense treatise of hospitality” (Derrida 21). Levinas’
theorization of the subject and Self positions it so that its openness or hospitality toward
the Other is its constituting feature. The Self not only welcomes the Other but is itself the
welcome. Thus ‘hospitality’ situates the subject and Self as a host or guest of and for the
Other and is defined by this relationship. Because of the Self’s receiving nature, Levinas
argues that its openness receives a kind of teaching. “The relation with the Other, or
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Conversation, is a non-allergic relation, an ethical relation; but inasmuch as it is
welcomed this conversation is a teaching” (Levinas 51). In order to receive teaching from
the Other any form of immune reaction to the Other must be put aside in a ‘non-allergic
relation.’ Derrida, years after writing on Levinas’ hospitality, goes on to describe the
shifting immune response that, in part, appears to support Han’s claim that the Other has
effectively become fully-hosted by the Self. In Rogues, he observes that during the Cold
War the Other-as-enemy dissipated into nameless individuals inside the State, rather than
as a clearly defined exterior enemy. In order to immunize the Self against threats
increasingly appearing inside the Self—hosted within the Self—parts of the Self must be
killed or immunized. Derrida goes in the opposite direction as Han, arguing that this
makes all others ‘wholly other.’ Han, on the other hand, believes that the Other has
dissolved into the Self. Oddly, both of these seemingly separate interpretations reflect
Matzinger’s observation that the Self contains both friendly and dangerous parts, which
are both considered the Self or part of the same cell.
The threat of atomized ‘Others’ inside the Self functions on another level, as
Derrida notes, the Self’s role as ‘host’ flips to ‘hostage.’ This leads to the interpretation
that the speckling of Others within the Self positions the Self as a hostage to these interior
dangers, aware of them but struggling to identify a ‘front’ for attack and defense. The
subject becomes a hostage of the Other because of its necessary openness to the Other. It
must be always vulnerable to whims outside its own, hence Levinas’ ‘non-allergic
relation.’ It is in this sense of hostage that we find Han’s understanding of the Self/Other
dynamic, or lack thereof. His concern with the positivized ‘differences’ that we can see in
collage is that we have become unwitting hostages. Where Han has built upon or deviated
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from Levinas is that in the neuronal age we are no longer able to actually understand
Otherness in any meaningful way. Our impulse toward conflict still exists, as the
previous sentence’s use of ‘opposition’ nods to, but our ability to commune or manage
the Other has evaporated. In this sense, we are hosting the Other while holding ourselves
hostage without consciously knowing this. In terms of collage, the composite image
brings Levinas’ hospitality into full focus. Each image-fragment hosts another in order to
come together as something new. Its hybrid form is each image’s hospitality toward
another.
Hybridity was important for Dada both as a methodology and as topic.5 They
sought to unify art and life. We can see it in their collage, Ernst’s frottage and grottage,
Tzara’s simultaneous poems and Duchamp’s readymades. All of these methodologies
work to combine one with another: frottage and grottage steal the texture of real objects
through a process of rubbing, which are then combined with other rubbings and
interventions made by the artist to create a new unified image; simultaneous poetry
merges and obliterates singular voices, their communications melting into a chance-based
production of sound and nonsense considered as one singular piece; and the readymade is
a hybrid of useful and useless, its status as art-object never completely removing its status
as a urinal, bottle rack, or shovel—never mind the obvious hybridity of assisted
readymades such as Marcel Duchamp’s Bicycle Wheel (1913), part stool and part wheel.

5

On hybridity as it relates to the Dadaist conception of Self, body, politics and artistic
practice, specifically in Europe, see Matthew Biro, The Dada Cyborg: Visions of the New
Human in Weimar Berlin and Elza Adamowicz, Dada Bodies: Between Battlefield and
Fairground.
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As for the Dadaist’s topical interest in the hybrid “one of the central themes of
Dada in Berlin and New York was man-as-machine. Feeling that mankind had
definitively thrown in its lot with mechanization, Dadaist artists in both cities developed a
highly sophisticated iconography of ‘mechanomorphs’, human-machine hybrids,” as we
can see in Murdering Airplane (Hopkins 103)—a curious choice for a movement so
intent upon bacteriological language, though, perhaps not, for a machine cannot catch a
cold. It is impervious, or at least indifferent to the threats of the immunological. A
machine has no immune system.6 It does not care about bacteria or microbes. Dadaists
were mechanomorphs, in their own words, “ghosts drunk on energy […] resin and rain
are our sweat, we bleed and burn with thirst, our blood is vigour” (Tzara 37). Their
relentless energy and nonsense are characteristic of a machine malfunctioning, computing
incompatible information. They perpetually want more, unable to turn themselves off
without the aid of the Other. Unable to rest or slack their thirst, they are a hybrid, both
human and machine ‘unable to not be not be able’, as Han would say, looking for the
Other to gratify and turn them off. Such a thing is undeniably a component of the
neuronal, not the immunological. The hybrid has a diffuse sense of Self and no immune
system, as Han acknowledges, “hybridization […] stands diametrically opposed to
immunization” (The Burnout Society 3). The hybrid depends upon a difference that lacks

6

Today this is no longer true, for we find a form of immune system in computers. Antivirus software and firewalls are just two examples of the ways our computers defend
against infection. Increasingly, digital media is discussed in terms of the bacteriological.
For example, Douglas Rushkoff’s ‘media virus’ is a characterization of the way media
mimics infection. However, the physical hardware of the machine is still without an
immune system. It is this pre-digital form of machine the Dadaists worked with.
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Otherness in order to assimilate it. This is produced by an excess positivity that
constitutes the hybrid status of not just being one, but mixed.
The hybrid leads us to a possible understanding of Dada’s interest in the
bacteriological. We never say we are infected with so many Alphacoronavirus parasites.
We say we have a cold. Bacteria’s pluralistic status as both one and many suited Dada
while being a quality of the neuronal. The ability to simultaneously portray microbes as
closed cells as well as mindless, interconnected swarms while inciting the viral lunacy of
the war and its associated illnesses is itself a hybridization. The bacteriological language
characterizes the contagious conflict of the First World War, but symbolizes conflict with
an unseen, exhausting force. This is a neuronal affliction. In this way, bacteria are a
halfway point between the outright combat of war and the self-imposed depression and
exhaustion of the neuronal age. Murdering Airplane captures this transition quite well as
it is clearly a depiction of war, though it is rendered psychologically. Anthropomorphizing the machine with the addition of human arms is a neuronal hybrid. The
affective quality of this plane-monster suspended like a spectre over the three soldiers is
in an environment completely devoid of any naturalism. Exhaustion, depression and their
unseen source permeates the image. The neuronal features of Murdering Airplane
abound, which brings about the question: when did the shift from the immunological to
the neuronal begin? Dada.
However, Han has a different answer: he says the neuronal began at the end of the
Cold War. Matzinger’s adjustment to the language of immunology hails the definitive
end to the immunological age. Han presents this as a sudden shift, leaving it surprisingly
and provocatively undeveloped. But, from studying Dada, we can see the emergence of
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neuronal behaviour and affliction far earlier than the end of the Cold War. Dada too
conflates the useful and dangerous. It speaks of infections with infarctions, clotting
around points of meaning, dismantling language and image in order to rebuild them
sometimes as useful ‘proteins’ and sometimes nasty aggregates. Dada no longer follows
the immunological logic of elimination. It includes nasty aggregates.

The Crisis of Fantasy
Inclusivity is the methodology of the neuronal. It “expresses itself as the exhaustion and
inclusion that characterize the society of achievement,” today’s society (The Burnout
Society 48). The neuronal operates through distinctions of difference rather than
Otherness.7 Like Matzinger’s cells, categories describe a Self composed of different
pieces that work together to make a whole. These different pieces, though distinct, are not
separated by the thresholds that bar the Self from the Other. The end of the
immunological means we have no immune response to the Other because the Other is no
longer recognized. The dangerous and unusable quality of the Other has been
incorporated into the Self through alliances and shrinking degrees of separation. What
has replaced the opaque interstice between Self and Other is the transparency of
categories.
Categories lack the opacity of Otherness, instead prioritizing transparency for the
sake of legibility, as we saw with the hybridization of collage. The edges of individual
pieces of the collage are permeable, allowing the image to be read as a whole. In this

‘Difference’ is a term favoured by Han that emphasizes capitalism’s interest in minute and
inconsequential changes between items. For example, the difference in colour between two toothbrushes
are completely inconsequential to their purpose, rendering them effectively the same. Han is particularly
concerned with this barely concealed sameness of ‘difference’ that he feels is replacing true otherness.
7
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way, transparency’s utilitarianism drains us of our imagination, resulting in a crisis of
fantasy, which Han claims is “the contemporary crisis in literature and the arts” (The
Agony of Eros 41). In order to optimize the smooth functionality of an increasingly
complex world transparency becomes an indispensable technique and quality, which
sacrifices literature and the arts to pornographic transparency.
The more transparent and visible systems of organization are the more legible,
and pornographic, their contents. The organization of categories removes surprises and
the unknown, accelerating the flow of information. This improves the usefulness of a
category’s contents. Such pornographic access to the information contained within
categories is ‘hypervisible.’ As Han says, this “is not conducive to imagination. As such,
pornography—which maximizes visual information, as it were—destroys erotic fantasy”
(The Agony of Eros 38). The more transparent the category the less imaginative its
contents and the less erotic the experience. For Han, the negativity of the erotic, which
veils portions of information, is also the constituting agent of the beautiful. In his words,
“it is the dress that is divine” (Saving Beauty 55). To remove the dress is to remove the
elusive quality of the beautiful.8 “Unveiling disenchants and destroys beauty. Thus, it lies
in the nature of beauty that it cannot be unveiled. / Pornography—as nakedness without
any drapes, without any secrets—is the opposite figure to beauty. Its ideal place is the
shop window” (Saving Beauty 53). The exposing ‘shop window’ of categories ruins the
beauty it may have contained, opting, instead, for the usefulness of transparency.

This is obviously a problematic construction. The implications attached to Han’s use of
the ‘dress’ ring with objectification of the female body. I have chosen to continue
working with the concept of the dress in an attempt to draw attention to the issues
entangled in Han’s use of the term on page 46 of this thesis.
8
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Through the shop window customers see objects they want and need, grouped
together in different displays for different stores depending on what exactly they are
looking for. For Han, these ‘wants’ and ‘needs’ differ from desire, which “is always
desire for the Other. The negativity of privation and absence nourishes it. As the object of
desire, the Other escapes the positivity of choice,” which so characterizes consumer
capitalism’s wants and needs (The Agony of Eros 37). In this way, desire demands limited
access, which it seeks to extend beyond. Though, the same could be said of wants and
needs, these terms also wish to extend beyond the limits that define them. The division
between having and not having is present in all three of these concepts. Drawing on the
previous distinction of ‘useful’ and ‘dangerous’, then, desire is unique because of its
drive to make the dangerous useful, or more accurately make the useless useful. Desire’s
nourishment from the Other—from privation and absence—is a longing for what cannot
be used, which paradoxically makes the Other’s uselessness useful as the end and means
congeal into one.
Marcel Duchamp’s In Advance of a Broken Arm (1915) grabs hold of this strange
paradox. His choice of everyday, mass-produced objects question whether the useful and
useless can co-exist. Dada in general did the same as it sought to merge art and life. But
Duchamp goes further by involving the ‘positivity of choice.’9 Choosing a ready-made
object to be art unveiled the process of production withheld from the spectator, where the
enchantment of how it was made resides. Instead, the readymade veiled something else

In the Agony of Eros, Han tells us, “unchecked freedom of choice is threatening to bring
about the end of desire. Desire is always desire for the Other. The negativity of privation
and absence nourishes it. As the object of desire, the Other escapes the positivity of
choice” (37).
9
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far more exhausting to consider—for many it was, and still is, outright depressing—the
question of what is art, anyway?10 Up until that moment art was defined by the way it
was made, with skill, effort and time. This conflation of art and life is seen dramatically
with In Advance of a Broken Arm. Originally made in 1915, before the infamous urinal,
this store-bought shovel disappeared from history only to reappear, reincarnated, for an
exhibition held at Yale by Professor George Heard Hamilton and artist Katherine S.
Dreier. As Hamilton recounts,
Nobody came to see it -- the papers were too taken up with the fall of Berlin -and it just dangled from the ceiling in an empty hall. Miss Dreier had insisted
that, since it really wasn't a painting or a piece of sculpture, it couldn't be hung on
a wall or placed on pedestal. And how right she was! Even standing it in a corner
wouldn't do, for then it suddenly became a shovel again. And, as Gertrude Stein
might have said, ‘If it wasn't a shovel, what was it?’ (That was hard to say, art
and life being what they are. When our little exhibition went on a tour, a janitor
at a Museum in Minnesota the next winter mistook it for a shovel, as well he
might, and went to work on a snowdrift, doing Duchamp's inscription no good.)
(Hamilton 30)
The janitor's ‘mistake’ was to assume that the shovel was only what it looked like: useful.
In retelling this story to members of the artistic community it is common for them to be
incensed by the janitor’s mistake, but they too misunderstand the shovel, this time as
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The tension between the artist-as-chooser and the artist-as-maker can been seen
particularly well in the debate between Walter Arensberg and George Bellows following
the submission of Fountain, see William A. Camfield, “Marcel Duchamp's Fountain: Its
History and Aesthetics in the Context of 1917.”
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useless. It is, frustratingly, both. The shovel’s ability to occupy both art and object
statuses destroys our ability to imagine or fantasize. Both options are plainly laid out,
leaving a decision not a fantasy. We are unable to avoid this positivity of choice; it is
forced upon us as spectators. The limits of art that were once obscured behind the
pleasure of skill are clearly displayed in the readymade as personal and subjective choice.
Artwork now lacks its erotic essence of being veiled, instead it is put on display. Since
the technologies of the immunological no longer work without the Other, our engagement
with the readymade can only ever hope to sooth neuronal affliction. The unavoidable
decision, etymologically related to ‘cutting,’ determines whether the readymade is art or
object on an individual person-to-person and object-to-object basis. This sheds the excess
positivity of choice but does not return us to the immunological. Instead it acknowledges
the mutual existence of the two. Han’s distinction of the immunological and neuronal
ages are claims to the predominate immunological afflictions at the beginning of the
twentieth century and neuronal at the end. Dada is historically couched in a time when
both were, and are still, equally present.
The deft movements of Duchamp’s mind do not keep us from falling away from
the immunological into the neuronal. Engagement with readymades often stops with its
unveiling of the creative act, with its transparency. Transparency’s lack of obscuration
leaves nothing to the imagination or fantasy. For fantasy to function there must be limits
to our access, the Other must be present. As Han says, there is a significant distinction to
be made between different kinds of limits:
Thresholds and transitions are zones of mystery and riddle—here, the atopic
Other begins […] The fences, or walls, that are being built today no longer
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stimulate fantasy, or fantasies, because they do not generate the Other. Instead,
they extend through the inferno of the same […] As configurations for shutting
out and excluding, such borders abolish fantasies of the Other. They no longer
constitute thresholds or transitions leading somewhere else. (The Agony of Eros
41)
This ‘somewhere else’ is not somewhere we are not; it is somewhere we can not
be. Categories, be they ‘useful’ and ‘dangerous’ or individual properties in a
neighbourhood scored by fences, do not present situations in which we can not be.
Rather, they offer easier identification of where we could be. We can see into these
spaces, these categories. Such pornographic openness and hypervisibility is the crisis of
fantasy, there is too much positivity, too much being seen. The transparency of categories
is a neuronal affliction that withers the imagination and creative production. The Dadaists
observed this early on.
As a result, Dada’s bacteriological language works against the crisis of fantasy to
muddy categories and pornographic transparency. However, it would be a mistake to
assume this would counteract their suffering. The neuronal afflictions of depression,
hyperactivity, exhaustion and so on “elude all technologies and techniques that seek to
combat what is alien” (The Burnout Society 1). In order to grapple with neuronal
suffering, first we must acknowledge it is not alien. Duchamp’s inclusion of subjective
choice was a significant contribution to art history because of its acknowledgement of
neuronal suffering without any attempt to combat it. He draws attention to the issue,
attempting to give voice to each sufferer in their individual judgement of the readymade’s
status as artwork. In this way, the spectator can inscribe their own rules and limits on art.
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This is precisely the techniques used by psychotherapists in their attempt to alleviate the
neuronal afflictions of their patients. We cannot fight depression as “depression eludes all
immunological schemes.” We can only listen to it, putting it on display, attempting to
rediscover a sense of community to lighten the isolation. In a section of The Burnout
Society, Han argues that for Alain Ehrenberg, “depression is the pathological expression
of the late-modern human being’s failure to become himself. Yet depression also follows
from impoverished attachment [Bindungsarmut], which is a characteristic of the
increasing fragmentation and atomization of life in society” (The Burnout Society 10).
The isolated, subjective interpretations Duchamp cultivates with his readymades are both
a response and symptom of the fragmentation Han brings to the fore. Individually, we
observe or ‘listen’ to these objects that fail to become the ‘retinal’ or aesthetically
pleasing art-experience we expect from them. Not only has this (since the advent of
conceptual art, at least in part following from Duchamp’s ‘anti-retinal’ artwork)
transmuted into the spectator’s failure to understand the artwork—a failure to become the
knowledgeable and cultured version of the Self—but it emphasizes the ‘impoverished
attachment’ of the categories of art. However, the isolated judgements of readymades
eventually congeal into ‘posterity,’ thus their fragmentation is not without hope of some
future union or community. A solution to the crisis of fantasy is suggested here. In a
roundabout way, Duchamp’s inclusivity and positivity of choice allows for a new
opposition to be made. The decision of the spectator cuts through excess positivity and
separates out what is art and what is not. Thus, Duchamp’s neuronal methodology of the
readymade offers a small step back toward the immunological.
The absence of this step leads to spectacle. Making the decision that In Advance
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of a Broken Arm as an idea, a conception, is ‘art’ distinguishes certain shovels as art, but
does not render them all as art. Leaving the decision uncut, as it were, leads the spectator
to assume any object, or even experience, can, then, be art. To continue along with this
assumption is pornographic as it aestheticizes all of life, emptying out the hidden portions
of meaning veiled by intention and particular decisions made by artists. Without this,
“pornographic, deculturalized images offer nothing to read. They function like
advertisements—by direct, tactile, and infectious means” (The Transparency Society 28).
The directness of the image and the undecided-readymade empties it of what we read
into. In this way, Han is careless with his words referring to pornographic images as
‘infectious.’ They are actually ‘contagious,’ like a thought or propaganda, as they lack the
Otherness, which does the infecting. In actuality, the pornographic image is empty:
“They empty out into spectacle. The society of pornography is a society of the spectacle,”
as its emptiness encourages accelerated consumption and exchange (The Transparency
Society 28). This over inundates the spectator with stimulus, clotting their ability to
conceive of desires that run deeper than superficial, transparent images.

Neutral Nothingness: Indifference, not Disinterest
Dadaists used the methodology of the spectacle while it was still interpretable as
confrontational, that is, immunological. Its infarctions sought to manifest the absurdity
and nonsense they saw in the world. It was Tzara’s interest, among many others, to
continue to confuse the boundaries that distinguished between things, a positive act that
destabilized the foundation of the immunological age later finalized in Matzinger’s work.
As Tzara claims, “I write this manifesto to show that people can perform contrary actions
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together” (Tzara 36). The affliction or suffering of Dada was due to inflicting excess
upon themselves, seeing the tendencies they so vehemently disdained in others, and more
broadly within the societies they were part of, in themselves as well. In this way, they
were not concerned with the other, but with immanent contradictions—with the Own.
We can see internal contradiction in several performances and personas of Dada:
Caberet Voltaire was a raucous bar in Zurich, owned and operated by Dadaist Hugo Ball.
Many of the major figures of Dada, such as Tzara, Marcel Janco, Emmy Hennings,
Richard Huelsenbeck, Sophie Taeuber-Arp and Hans/Jean Arp, would congregate there
to produce scenes of chaos as captured in a jumbled image painted by Janco in 1916,
Cabaret Voltaire; Arthur Cravan was perhaps not as well-known as many of the other
members of Dada, but he embraced the merger of art and life in a way difficult to
surpass. A Swiss eccentric and amateur boxer he enjoyed being introduced “with an
improbable list of credentials: ‘hotel thief, muleteer, snake charmer, chauffeur’ and so
on,” he skirted the Dadaist movement with the support and curiosity of Francis Picabia
and Marcel Duchamp, disappearing in 1918 as he set off rowing from Mexico to Buenos
Aires (Hopkins 40); André Breton, the future leader of Surrealism, gave a tour of the
church Saint-Julien-le-Pauvre on April 14, 1921. An otherwise unimportant and
abandoned space, Breton toured a small crowd around the grounds in order to find “the
marvellous within the mundane” (Haladyn 102). This event was, by most accounts, a
failure as the audience had come to understand the Dadaists as producers of spectacle
which supplemented their life rather than disrupted it; and finally, the simultaneous
occupation of object and art-object by the readymade provides one signifier with two
signifieds. These examples—Cabaret Voltaire, Arthur Cravan, the proto-Surrealist tours
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of Saint-Julien-le-Pauvre, collage and the readymades of Marcel Duchamp—are
moments, not of negativity, but excess positivity. Their antics are based on a surplus of
sound, identities, spectacle and signifieds, respectively and collectively. What is easily
mistaken for negativity in Dada—the lack of sense—is actually excess—nonsense—a
clot keeping the momentum of meaning from moving forward. This is perhaps seen most
profoundly in Tzara’s simultaneous poetry in which multiple speakers recite poems at the
same time, overlapping and cancelling out each other’s linguistic meaning.11 Such
nonsense is not produced from the lack of sense, but from an excess of sense.
Unlike the artistic movements before it, Dada never sought to become part of the
salon or dominant ideology. It never sought acceptance and in this way was never
properly rejected making it Other. It was ‘dangerous,’ though not foreign. “DADA
MEANS NOTHING,” Tzara exclaims (Tzara 36)—it signifies nothing. The emptiness of
the ‘Dada’ signifier functioned in opposition to a saturated immunological perspective. It
is a neuronal emptiness. An immunological nothingness would constitute a hostile entity
of resistance, a no-thing. Nothing, in the Dadaist sense (at least for Tzara), is not a
negation of meaning, rather it is a neutrality to meaning. Tzara’s specific use of ‘signifie’
rather than ‘sens’ in the original French is significant for its emptiness, not a lack of
direction.
It must be made absolutely clear that this emptiness is, in fact, quite full. The
belief that ‘nothing’ is actually empty is what Henri Bergson calls a ‘false problem’
stemming from words themselves. This is perhaps the reason, or at least a reason for
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See performance transcript by Richard Huelsenback, Marcel Janco and Tristan Tzara,
L'amiral cherche une maison a louer (1916).
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Tzara’s use of ‘signifie,’ as he very specifically emphasizes the linguistic feature of both
Dada and nothing. “‘Nothing’ designates the absence of what we are seeking, we desire,
expect. Let us suppose that absolute emptiness was known to our experience: it would be
limited, have contours, and would therefore be something. But in reality there is no
vacuum. We perceive and can conceive only occupied space” (Bergson 102–3). In this
way, the negativity of nothing becomes positivized. Thus,
this so-called representation of absolute emptiness is, in reality, that of universal
fullness in a mind which leaps indefinitely from part to part, with the fixed
resolution never to consider anything but the emptiness of its dissatisfaction
instead of the fullness of things. All of which amounts to saying that the idea of
Nothing, when it is not that of a simple word, implies as much matter as the idea
of All, with, in addition, an operation of thought. (Bergson 104)
Here, we can begin to see clearly that the ‘nothing’ Tzara attaches to Dada is a
combination of something disinteresting to those who still believe in logic and rationality
as well as an excessive positivity through which nothing and everything touch and blur
together. Nothing is just too much of something requiring too much effort to engage with.
To return to the distinction between ‘signifie’ and ‘sens,’ as we see in Duchamp’s
readymades the doubled signified of Fountain as a urinal and as an art-object is not
directionless. There are two directions. The readymade is empty of a decision about
which direction to take, appearing as though it is lacking sense when, in fact, it has too
much. Duchamp’s relocation of the production of art from a material process to an act of
choice—that is, a neuronal act—is very deliberate. In his words, “the choice was based
on a reaction of visual indifference with at the same time a total absence of good or bad
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taste... in fact a complete anesthesia” (Duchamp 141). This quote is in direct relation to
Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgement, the birthplace of modern aesthetics.
Kant tells us that to make an aesthetic judgement we must not be biased by our
own interests. “One must not be in the least prepossessed in favour of the real existence
of the thing, but must preserve complete indifference in this respect, in order to play the
part of judge in matters of taste” (Kant 43). If we are to claim something as beautiful it
must be separate from our interests, which lead us toward a purpose. To say the iridescent
coating of pearls is beautiful bears no weight on our ability to achieve the vast majority of
purposes we may be interested in. Disagreement on the beauty of a pearl is
inconsequential to our ability to live-with, unless this judgement is made with interest,
such as if the pearls were a gift. This would certainly be a problem for both the giver and
receiver of the pearls. In effect, this means that beauty’s uselessness in achieving a
purpose is a prerequisite for a judgement of taste.
What is interesting to take note of here is uselessness is not a negative to
usefulness’ positivity. That would lead to disinterestedness. The uselessness of
indifference and the foundation of aesthetic judgement is a neutral position unaffected by
personal connection. Those who criticize art for its ‘uselessness’ swing on a pendulum
too excitable for Kant’s liking. By seeking objects of visual indifference that conjure no
immediate judgements of taste, Duchamp draws upon Kantian indifference making a very
deliberate gesture to include the spectator in the creative act. Choosing the most
mundane, unremarkable object draws attention to the subjective mechanism behind the
aesthetic judgement of artwork. The keystone which supports the two signifieds of
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Duchamp’s readymades is the use(full/less)ness of the object, the quality of
simultaneously being useful and useless.
This simultaneity, in my reasoning, is a direct cause of the neuronal. It is
constituted by the possibility of being either useful or useless. This is an important point
worth saying twice, the neuronal is constituted, not by the separation of what is and is not
useful, but the pluralism engendered by the possibility of being both. Such pluralism
lacks a negative side, defining Han’s ‘achievement society,’ which is plagued by freedom
of choice. “Unlimited Can is the positive modal verb of achievement society. Its plural
form—the affirmation, “Yes, we can”—epitomizes achievement society’s positive
orientation” (The Burnout Society 8–9). Arguing for society’s ‘can-do’ attitude, Han is
claiming a kind of openness that was once limited by stronger taboos and expectations
encapsulated in his counter-term, ‘Should.’ If ‘can’ is the modal verb of today, we can
certainly find a serious and punning root in Duchamp’s readymades, especially Fountain;
a urinal can be both art and object. This simultaneity—neuronal’s excess positivity—
describes multiple potentialities that do not exist with enough certainty to cast the shadow
of negativity. So frequently described as negative, Dada is not a shadow of their time, of
World War I’s conflict, but a suspension of contrast, understanding and hope. Its
nonsense pours out into the early twentieth century as a ‘what if…’ mistaken as
something far more offensive. To be sure, such aggression was present, but it was aimed
inwards, towards the Self, at its failures and empty answers.
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I-tired
To attempt bacteriologically to understanding Dada is to question the nature of Nature as
bacteria presumably do not seek recognition but procreation. “If you find it is futile and
don’t want to waste your time on a word that means nothing… The first thought that
comes to these people is bacteriological in character: to find its etymological, or at least
its historical or psychological origin” (Tzara 36). The bacterial ‘first thought’ referenced
here by Tzara is infectious to those who wish to make sense of the world: the journalists,
academics, scientists and philosophers. What appears on its surface to be a pursuit of
recognition, an understanding of what Dada is, turns out to be contagious because it
procreates, breeding more questions and frustration. This is not an immunological act
against infection from the Other, but a neuronal hyperactive productivity that leads to
burnout. Such unending productivity results in exhaustion, or ‘I-tiredness’ as Han calls it.
“I-tiredness, as solitary tiredness, is worldless and world-destroying; it annihilates all
reference to the Other in favour of narcissistic self-reference” (The Burnout Society 36).
This is an unhealthy tiredness that no longer trusts in the world. Instead of relaxing into
something, into the world outside the Self, I-tiredness repeatedly stumbles over itself
unable to find somewhere else to rest. This is something we will explore in more depth in
the next chapter. The internal procreating contradictions of Dada are exhausting to say
the least. A strong indicator of the neuronal age.
In Han’s conception of the neuronal, the all-encompassing Self has included the
dangerous Other into itself. This does two things. First, the dangerous is always present,
but is difficult to identify and locate because recognition comes from conflict with the
Other. Without this clear distinction neuronal afflictions, such as exhaustion, appear from
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the perpetual imminence of danger. I-tiredness comes from being tired of one’s Self, that
is, exhausted by the perpetual presence of danger within the Self. Similarly, as the second
point, we cannot find somewhere else to set down or relax. There is no ‘somewhere else,’
only categories of the Same. In this particular case, we do not actually want to reach
somewhere else. We want to feel safe. Safe enough to allow our guard down, but to do
this ‘danger’ must be positioned outside of the Self once more, somewhere else. Our
inability to rest hinges upon the Other and moments of immunity. We can see this
intimated in Duchamp’s desire for the individual spectator’s judgement. Once a spectator
has decided a shovel is or is not art, that is, cut off access to the other option, the stress of
engaging with a readymade is quelled. However, this question must continually be asked
in order for the spectator to accumulated into posterity, itself an exhausting cumulative
‘neurality,’ if you will.
The neuronal drives the subject to exhaustion, as it works to be recognized by a
non-existent Other, causing burnout and depression. The excess positivity suffocates the
subject in itself as it seeks one achievement after another, looking to be rewarded by the
Other. Unfortunately, “the lack of relationship to the other causes a crisis in gratification.
Gratification as recognition assumes the authority of the other or a third party. It is not
possible to reward or recognize yourself” (Topology of Violence 26). Louis Aragon leans
on his friends for recognition who appear unable to give him a strong sense of who he is,
aside from his inconsistencies. The very style he uses is striking for its feeling of a diary
entry, having no intended outcome other than to produce, over-produce, and self-reflect
while being self-depreciating and depressive. The significance of Aragon’s form and
content is worth quoting at length:
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Today you find me abominably sad. All that my heart can produce is a damp
squib. You won’t like that image. I’m already beginning to bore you. I’m not
even going to swear at you. Who knows where weariness starts, who knows
where it ends? […] All I am aware of nowadays is this great emptiness inside
caused by those who are my friends as drops of water in a river are friends of the
drop they sweep with them to the sea. If you want to vouch for someone you say:
I’m as sure of him as I am of myself. And yet if there’s one man on this earth I
cannot be psychologically sure of, it’s me. I don’t take any notice of the rules I
set for myself; and this perpetual inconsistency enables others to recognize me
and call me by my name; I can’t see myself in profile. I’m always betraying
myself, letting myself down, contradicting myself. I’m not someone I’d ever put
my trust in. No need to despair on that score. But as you know, just one look
from my friends is enough to wreck all my plans—that’s why we’re friends. I
give everything up just to waste my time with them, I even drop myself. I
suppose you think I bestow on them the trust I refuse myself? Wake up! I know
all about their shortcomings, thousands of things about them shock me. They do
things I’d never do for all the gold in the world.
I know they have no great affection for me. It’s a long time since we
stopped carrying those little scales around with us that weigh up a person’s
worth. I don’t believe in my friends just as I don’t believe in myself.
(“Sensational Revelations” 195)
Aragon’s monologue recognizes his dependency on his friends without acknowledging
the Otherness of the immunological modality, as he likens himself and friends to ‘drops
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in the sea.’ Though he does point to a difference between what his friends would do that
he would never dream of doing, Aragon is also entirely willing to ‘drop himself,’ not in
selfless sacrifice, but in self-interested busying engagement. The inconsistencies in his
writing is a mutation of Han’s ‘achievement-subject.’ Although the Dadaists were
unconcerned with the late-capitalist achievements of Han’s achievement-subject, they
exhibited the same behaviour for different ends. The subject overworks itself because
“the feeling of having achieved a goal never occurs,” meanwhile there is a sense of being
projected toward something, that something is oneself and the satisfaction of oneself (The
Burnout Society 39–40). This cyclical process of perpetual achievement and redirection is
exhausting, never resulting in gratification.
Han’s critique of achievement roughly aligns with the Dadaists disdain for logic,
science and truth in order to sanitize the “plague produced by intelligence,” though this
relation should be carefully kept within machinic, computational kinds of intelligence
(Tzara 41). It was the Dadaists’ interest to escape the confines of politics and sciences
driven by just such a logic currently laying waste to Europe. Their intense distrust of
logic and support for individualist values was a direction without an aim, a generative act
without knowing the outcomes. “Dada; abolition of logic […] Dada; abolition of memory
[…] Dada; abolition of the future” (Tzara 42). The Dadas collapsed thought, time, space
and the Other into its Selves. They did not have somewhere to settle into, to rest, or
somewhere else to be. As Aragon said, “there is only me in this world” (Aragon 181).
And, following the logic Matzinger presents with her ‘useful’ and ‘dangerous’ cells, that
world is not fit for relaxation. There is only a thin membrane between the dangerous and
the useful and we know we need both. The Dadaists knew this too, though their position
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on the cusp of the immunological and the neuronal led them to believe this was freedom
and not the imprisonment Han suggests it is.
Tzara ends his manifesto, “Freedom: DADA DADA DADA, a roaring of tense
colours, and interlacing of opposites and of all contradictions, grotesques,
inconsistencies: LIFE” (42). Seemingly, in response, Han ends The Burnout Society by
writing: “Their life equals that of the undead. They are too alive to die, and too dead to
live” (51). The removal of the thresholds of the Other appeared to the Dadaists as
freedom, but to Han it is a hybridization of life and death. The ‘contradictions,
grotesques, inconsistencies’ of Dada are the zombies of today glued to their smartphones,
surrounded by unending advertising, stimulation and spectacle. What we find between
the two closing statements of Tzara and Han is a century of transition between two ages
Han presents as polarized. However, the immunological and the neuronal are both always
present, but with shifting emphasis. From a prioritizing of suffering caused by the Other
to suffering caused by our ‘Selfs,’ the Dadaist fantasy of contradiction strangely worked,
but only for the short moment they are able to straddle both of Han’s paradigms. They
need the ‘contra’ to their ‘diction,’ as it were, which art history quickly subsumes into the
canon—Art’s very own anti-art.
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Tired Vision: An Adaptation of Byung-Chul Han’s Unwritten Neuronal Optics
Immunological Optics
1. Tired Stories
Dada’s unique expression of both the immunological and neuronal modalities suggests a
unique perspective. Its classification as ‘anti-art’ within an art historical canon makes this
clear as it maintains a supposedly negative position as well as a positive one. This chapter
will consider how the Dadaist, Max Ernst, offers two forms of perception within his
collage Murdering Airplane. To do this, we must first understand Han’s ‘immunological
optics,’ his use of sight and related terms and then develop an accompanying ‘neuronal
optics.’
Immunological perception, laced with negativity, is driven by suffering. It sees
with the intention of protection against external, negative forces. In contrast, a purely
positive form of perception leads to what Han refers to as ‘pornography’—and as
‘bingewatching’—which allows everything in, overwhelming the senses. Pornography
“maximizes visual information,” which, in turn, “intensifies narcissification” as the
withholding of information, resistance, negativity, reminds us of Otherness (The Agony of
Eros 38, 46). Positive perception falls under what Han calls the ‘neuronal.’ It is
excessively positive in the sense that its affliction comes from the additive ‘too much,’
which manifests as hyperactivity, depression and burnout. In this way, neuronal affliction
is self-generated by a hyperactive impulse to do, see and sense everything. The neuronal
modality, for Han, is unable to manage negativity that would limit such overwhelming
stimulus, which leads to infarctions as everything piles up on itself, overwhelming the
subject. Upon a quick reading of his work it appears as though Han argues for actively
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instilling elements of negativity into our lives again in order to resist and order excess
stimulus into meaning. This gives Han’s writing a regressive, pastoral feeling that desires
a return to ‘the way things were.’ Though, in The Burnout Society’s discussion of
perception, we are able to construct another interpretation of the neuronal, opting for a
perception that seeks opportunities to learn rather than censor, consider possibilities
rather than linear outcomes, hold multiple interpretations rather than singular absolutes.
This is not an inability to manage negativity but a lack of interest in it, turning focus
away from conflict and opposition.
Han never explicitly develops the neuronal in a way that allows for learning,
which, for him, would be too stimulating to result in meaning. Instead, he rolls learning,
knowledge and theory into a relationship with negativity. This falls under the
immunological modality. The kind of perception that will be developed in the coming
pages stands at odds with what he calls an “immunological optics,” which only sees the
violence of negativity and loss imposed on the Self from an exterior Other. Such an
optics assumes that “everything foreign is simply combated and warded off” (The
Burnout Soceity 2). For this reason, immunological optics is biased toward seeing conflict
and a need for immunity. This excludes the increasing need for an understanding of
plurality in our contemporary age. Consequently, Han fails to describe a neuronal optics
that sees the violence of positivity with which he is so concerned, instead, he continues to
develop perception, particularly of beauty, in terms of militaristic defense by encouraging
veiling in the construction of beauty and describing beauty’s impact in terms of puncture.
Seeing the harmful nature of excess positivity is a pressing concern, which does appear to
be Han’s career-sized project. It describes the consequences of successfully cultivating
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abundance rather than loss or scarcity. It is worrisome that within an immunological
perspective positivity is a success and not a risk.
Han’s use of ‘neuronal’ refers to sensory and motor neurons, which may explain
why he never develops a neuronal optics. These two types of neurons relate to the
neuronal afflictions of hyperactivity, exhaustion and depression. Sensory neurons relay
stimulus from sensory organs; thus, they relate to light, sound, touch, smell and taste.
Motor neurons also relate to stimulus, governing the control of muscles and glands,
which keep us moving for fear of (immunological) death and (neuronal) achievement.
This does not correspond with the way Han uses the term ‘optics,’ which refers to a union
of sight and thought. A neuronal ‘optics’ in Han’s usage would be impossible as it would
see everything without differentiation or contemplation, thereby understanding nothing.
“Today, perception itself takes the form of ‘bingewatching’ […] One goggles oneself
unconscious,” as he puts it (The Expulsion of the Other 2).12 In contrast to Han’s sensory
and motor neurons there exists a third type Han has ignored: interneurons. Interneurons
connect neurons to one another allowing complex functions such as learning and
decision-making. (Inter)neuronal optics that follow the impulse to learn rather than move
would reasonably see possibilities to learn, by default enjoying contemplation and play,
while also lacking an impulse toward conflict, which only limits interconnection and
possibility. This third kind of neuron eludes Han. (Inter)neuronal optics do not
necessarily fall victim to the rationality and logic the Dadaists found so abhorrent. This
form of connectivity maintains the possibility of escaping the fixed, linear routes of
rationalism, leaning toward the transience of play more than the expectations of logic.

12

Although awkward, this quote is correct to the English translation of The Expulsion of the Other by
Wieland Hoban. However, ‘goggles’ and ‘googles’ are both equally satisfactory to my mind.
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2. Defense
(Inter)neuronal optics is counterintuitive for the immunologically minded. Life, as we are
commonly told, depends on a balance between negative and positive forces implying the
immunological’s relationship with negativity is necessary and natural. Thus, the idea of
defense is deeply ingrained in us, even within contexts meant to bind us in the most
willing of ways. Love, for example, is an experience which binds us to the negativity of
another. But “today, love is being positivized into sexuality” (The Agony of Eros 12).
Thus, love’s defences are dissipating in the face of consumption in contemporary society,
which “endeavors to eliminate atopic otherness in favor of consumable – heterotopic –
differences” (The Agony of Eros 2). What replaces love, then, is pornography as the
Other’s body is seen “fragmented into sexual part-objects” (The Agony of Eros 12).
Differences between the parts are necessarily without ‘defense’ because they are
consumable, but also because they come together to make a whole. Defense would only
serve to impede both consumption and unity in the neuronal age.
The consequences of positivizing love are, evidently, confusing. In Badiou’s
foreword to The Agony of Eros he betrays his misunderstanding of Han’s nonconfrontational, neuronal model by framing Han’s intentions within ‘defense’: “Whatever
the case, this remarkable essay, an intellectual experience of the first order, affords one of
the best ways to gain full awareness of and join in one of the most pressing struggles of
our day: the defense, that is to say – as Rimbaud desired it – the ‘reinvention,’ of love.”
(The Agony of Eros xi). Han’s concern with love is not ours. In fact, it is not his concern
either, but a euphemism for eros, the motor of thought, intrigue, friendship and

42

coexistence with the Other. Badiou’s misunderstanding of this is not limited to Han’s
book, rather it extends to Han’s larger project of perceiving the world without the conflict
inherent to immunological optics.
A consequence of Han’s project is that offense, defense and its failure are no
longer an effective way to describe what causes us pain. In the immunological past these
kinds of actions came from the negativity of the Other. But now, as one of the main
tenets of Han’s theories, there is no Other to defend against. As Han says in the Topology
of Violence, “it does not make sense to strengthen defenses to combat the violence of the
same,” which is the consequence of losing meaningful difference created by negativity
(Topology of Violence 93). And as he says in The Burnout Society, in the twenty-first
century we do not suffer “from the negativity of what is immunologically foreign, but
from an excess of positivity. Therefore, [our illnesses] elude all technologies and
techniques that seek to combat what is alien” (The Burnout Society 1). Of course, such
techniques not only include but necessitate defense, a concept only accessible through an
immunological perspective:
The immunological dispositive, which extends beyond the strictly social and onto
the whole of communal life, harbors a blind spot: everything foreign is simply
warded off. The object of immune defense is the foreign as such. Even if it has no
hostile intentions, even if it poses no danger, it is eliminated on the basis of its
Otherness. (The Burnout Society 1–2)
Badiou’s belief that Han is ‘defending’ love assumes that something is attempting to
eliminate love’s Otherness—the Otherness of eros. He sees the threat of elimination and
the need for defense in Han, but really it is his own immunological optics. Such an optics
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fails to meet Han’s concern about neuronal affliction, which comes from inside and
cannot be defended against. The Otherness of eros is not under siege but its opposite, it is
ignored. It is not gone as Han provocatively claims. One simply no longer pays attention
to it.
This often leads us to “the false impression that [violence] has disappeared,” a
vital mistake produced by immunological optics. “Martial violence is currently giving
way to an anonymized, subjectified, systemic violence that conceals itself as such
because it becomes one with society” (Topology of Violence vii). The critiques Dada
posed to society at the beginning of the twentieth century should not be far from our
thoughts here. Although what immediately comes to mind during the commonly
recognized period that Dada was active (1916–1920) is likely World War I, obviously a
time of horrific physical conflict, Dada is primarily associated with critiques of
rationalism. This is what drove Max Ernst to write, “our rage had to find expression
somehow or other. This we did quite naturally through attacks on the foundations of the
civilization responsible for the war—attack on language, syntax, logic, literature, painting
and so forth” (Simmons 243).13 In their eyes rationalism and the systems of governance
in place at that time had failed miserably in achieving what was presumed would be
utopias through science and logic. As a consequence, ‘martial violence’ was not the true
perpetrator of suffering, but the ‘anonymized, subjectified, systemic violence,’ which
caused the chain reactions that lead to the war and stupidities that perpetuated it. The

This quotation is taken from Sherwin Simmons’ chapter “Dada and Kitsch: Cultivation
of the Trivial” in Virgin Microbes: Essays on Dada. It was translated from an interview
in German between Patrick Waldberg and Max Ernst for Kunst authentisch. See Virgin
Microbes 250.
13
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alliances between nations at the turn of the century was what drew the world into war,
and it was an outmoded sense of honour and military tactics posed against new
technologies that resulted in the loss of so many lives. We struggle to see this form of
violence and subsequently its afflictions because they are not produced by negativity.
Han himself struggles with the aforementioned idea in Saving Beauty. Upon
considering the nature of beauty, he weaves contradictory thoughts into his project to
escape the simple binary of attack-and-defense. His thoughts on ‘seeing’ lapse into an
immunological mode as he describes “seeing in the emphatic sense” as always “seeing
differently, namely, experiencing. It is impossible to see differently without exposing
oneself to injury” (Saving Beauty 33–4). The idea that ‘seeing’ is intimately related to
change is, of course, enticing. Though, the attachment of revelation to injury is a lapse
into the immunological optics Han himself is working to point out are obsolescing.
Supposedly, beauty punctures through complacency compelling us to act or, to
invoke André Breton, convulse. For Han, the experience of beauty, in a profound sense,
is one that should provoke us because “the task of beauty, first of all, is to produce
stimuli and to generate attention” (Saving Beauty 57). This initial task of beauty has
become too successful. Reducing it to quick, meaningless and ‘smooth’ experiences that
exist purely as spectacle. Excessively smooth depictions of beauty are pornographic; they
exhibit no resistance, in fact, they exhibit everything but resistance. This is precisely what
makes them pornographic. Such exhibitionist images are too quickly consumed, lacking
any form of depth that might encourage lingering. “Everything is measured by its
exhibition value. The society of exhibition is a society of pornography. Everything has
been turned outward, stripped, exposed, undressed, and put on show. The excess of
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display turns everything into a commodity” (The Transparency Society 11). Pornography,
in this way, is anything but contemplative. It does not stimulate the neurons. Rather, it
shrivels them. Pornography is quickly consumed and forgotten, merely pleasing us. It is
the phenomenon of smooth consumption, so smooth that we barely notice it happening.
Injury, on the other hand, as Han and other aestheticians have argued, causes a
change in perspective that shocks us out of normalcy by ‘deepening’ the experience of
beauty. It is only in modern thought that we have lost the negativity of beauty, which
provides it with its injurious possibility. In Han’s reading of Plato, his “metaphysics of
beauty is in sharp contrast to the modern aesthetics of beauty; the latter is an aesthetics of
pleasure, which confirms the subject in its autonomy and complacency, instead of
shocking it” (Saving Beauty 29). In this way, true beauty cuts through us, extending
beyond the merely calculable into the imaginative and unexpected. Such an incisive
experience of beauty ‘injures’ us because it spurs passion and change via an infection
from the external world puncturing through our defenses.
Without the shock and injury of beauty, modern aesthetics has no consequence. It
changes nothing. ‘Seeing differently’ requires a consequential shift in our perception and
approach to the world. The solution Han presents to work against pornographic beauty is
nostalgic for the immunological: the defence against puncturing vision, though not it the
way one might immediately expect. He promotes the erotic, which differs from the
pornographic as it defends against the easy access of the eye to all that it desires. In his
words, “it is the dress that is divine. The veiling is essential for beauty. Thus, beauty
cannot be undressed or unveiled. The impossibility of unveiling beauty is its nature”
(Saving Beauty 29). But, what Han misses in his description of beauty is precisely what
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he begins with in this quotation, namely, the dress. Perhaps, it really is the dress that is
divine, and it is the fluttering of the fabric that is beautiful.14 With this suggestion it
would be easy to claim provocatively that it is the act of unveiling that is beautiful and by
its nature also fleeting. Doing this would only serve to send us back into the language of
defense as we cover and uncover, falling into the same trap as Han. Focusing on the
unveiling of what is hidden by the dress is only an overcoming of the dress’ resistance;
this is not beauty, but an opposition, a conflict, and does not define a (inter)neuronal
perception. So, instead I turn our attention specifically to the flutter of the dress, that is,
the movement of it as it exists in the world and all of its complexity, not as an abstracted
element which art so frequently becomes.15 A flutter is playful, not defensive. Rather than
caused by the actions or implications of negativity or injury, a flutter of the dress is the
consequence of connections between the wind, body and the fabric itself. It cannot be
adequately explained with the language of attack-and-defense. If an immunological
optics sees immunological beauty that punctures and injures in order to provoke a change
within the Self, then a (inter)neuronal optics sees beauty as it draws connections between
different elements that are themselves always already in flux. Seeing in this way is not a
gaze that undresses or unveils or requires the mechanism of defense, but is instead an

Han’s combined use of the ‘dress,’ ‘penetration’ and the erotic is extremely
problematic. In my following development of a fluttering dress as playful and beautiful I
had in mind a non-gendered dress, simply imaging the movement of fabric as a toga, kilt
or the skirt of a bed. What lies underneath the dress should have no influence on the
observations of the fabric itself.
15
Art’s tendency to be abstractions of and abstracted from the world deserves to be
explained at length, which it often has been in studies of the museum and its functions
such as with Douglas Crimp’s On the Museum’s Ruins and Brian O’Doherty’s Inside the
White Cube: The Ideology of the Gallery Space.
14
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observation with the intent to learn, in the broadest sense of the word, about the
intricacies of the world as it is.

(Inter)neuronal Optics
1. Perception
Han devotes a specific section of The Burnout Society to ‘seeing.’ “The Pedagogy of
Seeing” develops the vita contemplativa as a counterpoint to Hannah Arendt’s interest in
the vita activa.16 This mirrors a tendency in all of his writing toward revitalizing
contemplation in an age of noise, distraction and a compulsion to do. Such hectic
movement leads to burnout, an exhaustion without end. One is unable to take a slow,
tired gaze that “rouses a special kind of visibility” in which “everything becomes
extraordinary” (The Burnout Society 32) or one achieves a ‘tired vision’ in which “things
flicker, twinkle, and vibrate at the edges.” Han claims tiredness “lends them an aura of
friendliness,” though it follows from The Burnout Society’s development of the neuronal
and over-stimulation that it lends things a sense of wonder as well (The Burnout Society
33). A truly tired subject, as opposed to an exhausted ‘I-tired’ subject, which we will
return to later, is not without the ability to wonder and contemplate; rather, the tired

Han has adapted Arendt’s understanding of action here to his own benefits, as he often
does by cherry picking from the thinkers he cites. This can be misleading, but also
generative, provoking new lines of thought and conversation, which I believe to be centre
to Han’s writing style. That is to say, many may condemn his selective reading of
philosophers for straying for the normal model of academic writing. Here, Han has
collapsed Arendt’s distinctions between action, labour and work under one term while
glazing over the subtle—and sometimes explosive—consequences of action that would
inevitably lead to contemplation.
16

48

subject has the negative capability not to act, intentionally choosing to divert their
energies toward observation and thought.
The negative capacity to filter external stimuli is an inherently immunological
quality. First, it requires a sense of an outside. Second, it requires a resistance or
immunity to the Other, which the vita contemplativa filters. The vita contemplativa is
“not a matter of passive affirmation and being open to whatever happens. Instead, it
offers resistance to crowding, intrusive stimuli,” which begins to muddy the dualistic
mind-body split implied by the ‘immunological’ and ‘neuronal’ terms Han introduces at
the beginning of the book (The Burnout Society 21). It is the capacity for the vita
contemplativa to say no, just as it is the capacity of the immune system to reject what
makes Han’s concept of thought (as well as beauty) immunological.
To return to Han’s use of Arendt, he criticizes her work by claiming that “it
escapes her notice that the loss of the ability to contemplate—which, among other things,
leads to the absolutization of vita activa—is also responsible for the hysteria and
nervousness of modern society” (The Burnout Society 20). “It is hyperactive and
hyperneurotic” (The Burnout Society 18). Thus, activity turns into hyperactivity, which in
turn keeps us too busy to contemplate. We have too much of what Han calls “positive
potency,” which is “the power to do something,” while we lack the balance of “negative
potency,” or “the power not to do,” which keeps our senses from being “utterly at the
mercy of rushing, intrusive stimuli and impulses” (The Burnout Society 24). Tristan
Tzara’s claim in his “Dada Manifesto 1918” that ‘Dada means nothing’ is a desire for
negative potency. Interrupting the signification of a specific meaning causes a pause. It
breaks up the intentionality of communication. Tzara is pointedly expressing Dada’s
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interest in saying ‘no’ to rational meaning. Being able to slow down, reflect and think are
qualities of negative potency that provide agency to resist the bulldozing effect of
incessant modern life.
This is what learning to see means for Han: “making yourself capable of deep and
contemplative attention, casting a long and slow gaze” (The Burnout Society 21). In this
way, sight and thought are intimately related, in fact, they meet under the term
‘perception.’ This explains why “The Pedagogy of Seeing” deals very little with actual
optics; for Han, seeing is inextricably bound up with thinking. When he later claims in
The Agony of Eros that the vanishing of borders and thresholds are causing a
“contemporary crisis in literature and the arts,” Han is not referring to actual borders, but
to conceptual limits (41). This supports a reading that ‘the disappearance of the Other,’
which is the constituting agent of borders and thresholds is more about appearance than
actuality. The neuronal mode, which has led to the crisis, does not perceive the Other or
its limits, producing a problem of trying to think outside a box that for all intents and
purposes does not appear to exist.
The fences, walls, trenches, mountain ranges, seas, and rivers that no longer
constitute thresholds of the Other are not unable to be thresholds; rather, they lack the
ritualistic, narrative context that imbues space and concepts with limits. “In all rites of
passages, one dies a death in order to be reborn beyond the threshold” (The Expulsion of
the Other 34). But how many of us today believe in spiritual death strongly enough to
appear ‘beyond the threshold,’ on the other side? Never mind that rites of passage are
constructed by communities and ours is an impatient ‘swarm’ of individuals intent upon
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smooth experiences that contain no negativity, pain and certainly not death.17 Similarly,
the detestation of hybridity expressed in monstrous werewolves and chimeras of old are
concerned with the transgression of thresholds much harder to find in the contemporary
‘cyborg’ of Donna Haraway. Han’s project, then, is to think the world without those
thresholds that once regulated the way we ‘see’ the world and its parts as Other. That is,
the way we think the world, both in and out of being. His claim that there is a ‘crisis’ in
the arts stemming from the inability to see the Other is misleading. It implies the
production of fine art and literature no longer meets with or generates the Other when it is
more accurate to say the spectator no longer uses an ‘optics’ to be able to perceive the
Other, negativity or somewhere else.

2. Special Vision
The capacity for thought is absolutely essential for cultivating anything that escapes the
trap of excess positivity and neuronal affliction. The abundance of vita activa causes us
to be run down, burnt out and depressed because of our hyperactivity, hypervisibility and
hyperaesthesia. In the hyper “everything is mixed with everything else. The boundaries
between inside and outside become increasingly permeable” (The Expulsion of the Other
35). Designated spaces and times for rest are equally meant for work, never allowing for

The use of ‘swarm’ is in reference to Han’s book In the Swarm; “The new mass is the
digital swarm. Its features distinguish it radically from the crowd—the classical form that
the many assumed. The digital swarm does not constitute a mass because no soul—no
spirit—dwells within it. The soul gathers and unites. In contrast, the digital swarm
comprises isolated individuals. […] Individuals who come together as a swarm do not
develop a we. No harmony prevails—which is what welds the crowd together into an
active entity. Unlike the crowd, the swarm demonstrates no internal coherence” (10).
17
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tired vision to set in. Just because I find myself in bed, watching TV, after a few glasses
of wine on the weekend does not mean telemarketers and emails from work will not find
me as well. Without the time or place for a slow, tired gaze to take stock of the situation,
the various perspectives, opinions, ideas—not to mention the beautiful play of things as
they exist around us—we continually over- and re-produce our afflictions. Our own
compulsion to over-work kicks up dust that inhibits our own ability to perceive.
The benefits of a special vision granted by tiredness are lost on the neuronally
afflicted achievement-subject that cannot rest. The achievement-subject “works for
pleasure and does not act at the behest of the Other. Instead, it hearkens mainly to itself
[…] In this way, it rids itself of the negativity of the ‘commanding [gebietender] Other’”
(The Burnout Society 38). Without the Other, the achievement-subject experiences
another crisis, this time of gratification. No longer subjected to work for a master but
compelled to work for itself—for its own achievements—the achievement-subject works
without stopping. “Because the structure of gratification has been disturbed, the
achievement-subject feels compelled to perform more and more” (The Burnout Society
38). Han describes the consequences of this as ‘I-tired.’
Such an I-tired subject is so exhausted, so overloaded, so overworked that it is
“incapable of doing something”—anything (The Burnout Society 33). I-tiredness “is
worldless, world-destroying tiredness” (The Burnout Society 32). It is isolated and
isolating, unable to relax into the world because of its expansive ego. It is hard to put
your head down in your own lap, as it were. Such a subject does not lack wakefulness,
rather it is unable to let go of it. It is effectively undead; to quote Han’s closing sentiment
from The Burnout Society, “they are too alive to die, and too dead to live” (51). This
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stands in contrast to what novelist and playwright Peter Handke, calls ‘we-tiredness,’
which stems from communal labour in the pursuit of a common goal and the negative
potency to reject purpose-driven activity. In practice, this appears to Handke in his
childhood memories such as observing a carpenter’s lunch break, during which they
casually swap stories or talk about the weather, or, as an adult, a sleepless red-eye flight
leading to a day of indifferently watching the passers-by in a new city. For Handke, this
is specifically geared toward creating a restful space for storytelling and listening, largely
due to a form of perception interested in sharing time together. For Han’s purposes,
tiredness contains a form of perception uninterested in conflict and inherently aimed
toward negative potency.
Tiredness contains a portion of negativity for Han that is not part of positive
exhaustion. The exhausted simply collapse while the tired rest in what we can call a kind
of liminal state that pauses between the extremes of hyperactivity and coma. Han is not
remiss to note an immunological optics in his section “The Society of Tiredness” as it is
here that he begins to describe the initial groundwork for a neuronal optics that sees
potential and wonder in the world-that-is in a playful way that escapes the binary of
attack-and-defense, as well as positivity and negativity. With tiredness a unique form of
fantasy appears, which is not based on being ‘somewhere else’ but is grounded in the
reality in which we currently occupy. As Handke says, “‘fantasy’ comes to the ideally
tired man but is different from the fantasy of the sleepers in the Bible or the Odyssey,
who have visions: without visions his fantasy shows him what is” (Handke 40). The
distinction Handke draws between visions and fantasy highlights an antiquated
assumption that a higher power—the Other—is opening a window onto somewhere else;
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rather, the hallucinatory fantasy of tiredness draws attention to the details of life as it is
here now, without embellishment.
I believe this is the initial seed for Han’s surprising statement made in The Agony
of Eros that there is a ‘crisis in the arts’:
When borders and thresholds vanish, fantasies of the Other disappear too. The
contemporary crisis in literature and the arts stems from a crisis of fantasy: the
disappearance of the Other […] The fences, or walls, that are being built today no
longer stimulate fantasy, or fantasies, because they do not generate the Other […]
They no longer constitute thresholds or transitions leading somewhere else. (The
Agony of Eros 41)
To draw a relationship between this bold claim and Handke’s tired perception suited for
storytelling, ‘fantasies of the Other,’ as Han calls them, are the stories shared by other
people—that is, (an)Other’s fantasies. In this way, the ‘crisis’ we are undergoing is one
of loneliness which, whether due to traditional grand narratives or something else, leads
us to believe that the Other will unify us through war, patriotism, visions or some other
means. I hesitate to mention myth as well because for Handke myth would be a
wonderfully appropriate means to achieve fantasy. The telling of myths, or more
appropriately the tired moments in which storytelling is most effective, is a kind of lens
through which we see the world as it is. What we have instead is burnout. Burnout does
not allow us to communally relax and share such stories, instead seeking isolated
activities that hardly constitute rest and make no room for the fantastical, yet simple,
flutter of a dress.
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3. Tired Vision
The term ‘neuronal’ points toward perceptual shifts needed for a new optics that sees or,
more accurately, thinks the violence of positivity. Immunological optics is unable to see
the afflictions created by excess positivity because of its disposition toward the tactics of
attack and defense. This way of seeing no longer makes sense—both in terms of
sensation and thought—when affliction is produced by internal drives that cause us to
overwork and burnout. As Han explains, “neuronal violence leading to psychic
infarctions is a terror of immanence. It differs radically from horror that emanates from
the foreign in the immunological sense. Medusa is surely the immunological Other in its
extreme form. She stands for radical alterity that one cannot behold without perishing in
the process” (The Burnout Society 6). The mere idea of ‘seeing’ Medusa is horrifying in
the story. It strongly influences the way Perseus behaves in her lair, encouraging him to
find a new means of seeing. He picks up a bronze shield and uses its reflection to see the
world in reverse. Although this changes the nature of his sight it does not change the
nature of his perception. He still sees the shield as a form of defense while seeking to
attack the Medusa. Perseus’ aggressiveness and limited range of action (attack and
defense) is the immunological modality.
“Neuronal violence, on the other hand, escapes all immunological optics, for it
possesses no negativity. The violence of positivity does not deprive, it saturates; it does
not exclude, it exhausts. That is why it proves inaccessible to unmediated perception”
(The Burnout Society 6–7). But what is ‘unmediated perception’? Scientifically and
materially speaking, mediation has been an inseparable feature of vision for centuries, if
not always-already stipulated. Galileo, the telescope, Kepler, the invention of the lens and

55

later the scientific instruments of the nineteenth century such as the thaumatrope,
phenakistiscope, zootrope, stereoscope and kaleidoscope prove that vision is a mediated
sense, if not by the physics of light and electrical impulses, then by the mind. Assuming
that Han is aware of this history, this is not a moment in which he is conflating optics and
perception, but is specifically referring to the union of sight and thought. In order to get a
sense of what ‘unmediated perception’ might be we must turn to Jonathan Crary in his
book Techniques of the Observer, in which he makes an important distinction between
the ‘spectator’ and the ‘observer.’
‘Spectator’ has a specific connotation, Crary argues, “namely, of one who is a
passive onlooker at a spectacle” whereas ‘observer’ “means ‘to conform one’s action, to
comply with,’ as in observing rules, codes, regulations, and practices. Though obviously
one who sees, an observer is more importantly one who sees within a prescribed set of
possibilities, one who is embedded in a system of conventions and limitations”
(Techniques 5–6). In this way, ‘unmediated perception’ is the passive positivity of
spectatorship that cannot see neuronal violence because it is unable to see the laws that
govern its suffering, mistakenly attributing suffering to effects of immunological attacks.
Immunological optics is unable to see the ‘rules, codes, regulations, and practices’ of the
neuronal mode. It stares blankly onto excess positivity seeing only success.
The ‘success’ of positivity is what concerns Han and it appears later in another of
Crary’s books. In 24/7, he interrogates the temporality of 24/7 capitalist culture, believing
sleep represents a threshold that still offers some protection against aggressive
neoliberalism. Sleep still leads somewhere else. However, the omnipresence of electric
light threatens this threshold. Its perpetuity burns away any possibility of a ‘shaded
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domesticity’ and private sphere. It exposes everything under its harsh light, literally and
figuratively. The constant buzz of florescent light and screens allow both day and night to
be coopted by work. The 24/7 worker dissipates the natural order of their circadian
rhythm. This should sound familiar as it was Han’s reason for criticizing Arendt’s vita
activa-cum-hyperactivity, which he feels reduces life to ‘bare life’ through a perpetual
compulsion to work and the destruction of a meaningful sense of time. As Crary writes:
“24/7 denotes the total wreckage of the day as much as it concerns the extinguishing of
darkness and obscurity. Desolating any luminous conditions expect those of functionality,
24/7 is part of an immense incapacitation of visual experience” (24/7 33). The perpetuity
of light for Crary is not only the erosion of play, leisure, and relaxation into machinic
productivity, but also the erasure of our last point of resistance against neoliberalism. It is
hard to commoditize ‘unproductive’ sleep. In this way, Han’s I-tiredness and Crary’s
24/7 culture are virtually identical. Both refuse the possibility of tired vision. For both
Han and Crary, we suffer from hyperactivity and the hypervisible.
The disappearance of thresholds, such as tiredness, that would traditionally filter
perceptual input through observation of certain rules, such as when and when not to
work, has created an affliction of too much stimulation. Instead, sheer exhaustion has
replaced tiredness in which there is no gradation between the intensified poles of
hyperactivity and the full stop of comatose power naps. This is the ‘immense
incapacitation of visual experience’ Crary references. Every visible image is limited to
function. Such an inundation of information and excess stimulus, “radically changes the
structure and economy of attention. Perception becomes fragmented and scattered” as we
superficially skim rather than deeply contemplate (The Burnout Society 12). This clogs
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our ability to playfully see onto somewhere else. Instead, we are compelled to see
everything unceasingly:
Today, faced with the sheer volume of hypervisible images, we can no longer shut
our eyes. The rapid succession of images leaves no time to do so, either. Shutting
your eyes is negativity, which does not pair well with the positivity and
hyperactivity of contemporary acceleration society […] this also accounts for the
achievement-subject’s nervous exhaustion. (The Agony of Eros 40)
Letting everything in overwhelms the achievement-subject. It never learned to see, as it
were. This is why Han puts such emphasis on the union of sight and thought in “The
Pedagogy of Seeing”: “learning to see means ‘getting your eyes used to calm, to patience,
to letting things come to you’” (The Burnout Society 21, in part quoting Nietzsche).
Without this lesson, Han’s positive subject does not have negative potency. It is unable to
not be able, as Han would say, to see sheer functionality. Continual, uncritical
consumption of stimulus is the aim. In this light, it is difficult to call this form of seeing
‘perception.’ It lacks a union with thought that draws the distinction between sight and
perception.
This lacks any sense of wonder or pause created by tired vision. The eyes of 24/7
culture are exhausted; their bleariness lack any of the wonder of tired eyes. Exhaustion
does not leave room for wonder, curiosity or play. It does not take the time to relax back
into the world with others. Relaxing with others requires ‘we-tiredness’ that is a shared
and trusting tiredness, which loosens “the strictures of the ego” allowing us to melt back
into the world (The Burnout Society 31). “This tiredness,” Han says, “founds a deep
friendship and makes it possible to conceive of a community that requires neither
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belonging nor relation. Human beings and things show themselves to be connected
through a friendly and” (The Burnout Society 33). With this approach, tiredness escapes
the neuronally afflicted ‘and’ that leads to hyperactivity and crushes contemplation.
Instead, “tiredness enables the human being to experience singular calm, serene notdoing. It is not a state in which the senses languish or grow dull. Rather, it rouses a
special kind of visibility” (The Burnout Society 32). It escapes what Crary calls 24/7’s
‘paucity of tonal differentiation’. We-tiredness ‘inspires’. There is a kind of magic to
tired perception. So, tiredness may indeed be a threshold onto the Other as Crary
suggests.18 But this threshold is not something to be fought with. It’s something to relax
into or with.
Crary’s belief that sleep is the last remaining uncommodifiable threshold in
contemporary life is a romantic one. But so too is Han’s notion of a tired vision with a
special capacity for friendliness. In Techniques of the Observer, Crary makes a point of
stressing his interest in the ‘observer’ over the ‘spectator’. Though, his observer stems
from a focus on “a complex remaking of the individual as observer into something
calculable and regularizable,” which held human vision as “something measurable” more
than a qualitative experience (Techniques 17). This quantified perception, following
specific rules and regulations, matches closely to Han’s fear of calculation. Derived from
statistics, calculation appears to be rapidly replacing theory and deep contemplation in

18

Han offers a remarkably similar series of observations as Crary three years earlier in
the original, German edition of The Burnout Society, Müdigkeitsgesellschaft. In the
English edition Han suggests tiredness “reestablishes the ‘duality’ that solitary tiredness
destroys utterly” (32).
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the minds of the general public and the technologies industries which lead it.19 Such
mechanical ‘thinking’ dissolves a little with tiredness, becoming somewhat
hallucinogenic: “Deep tiredness loosens the strictures of identity. Things flicker, twinkle,
and vibrate at the edges. They grow less determinate and more porous and lose some of
their resolution. This particular in-difference lends them an aura of friendliness” (The
Burnout Society 33). It is on this same note that Crary ends 24/7 believing that with
tiredness we will find “different places, in many disparate states, including reverie or
daydream.” The slight distancing nourished by tiredness needs a romanticism to make
things magical and ‘twinkly’ enough to bother dreaming up. Perhaps what is most
compelling about this argument is its normality. Like observing the flutter of a dress,
tired vision does not require work or exceptional circumstances but a soft willingness to
pause; as Crary says, “sleep which, at the most mundane level of everyday experience,
can always rehearse the outlines of what more consequential renewals and beginnings
might be” (24/7 128).

4. Murdering Airplane
Max Ernst understood tiredness as a way to see elusive possibilities. This is made clear in
his writing “Visions of Half-Sleep,” first published in La Révolution surréaliste in 1927,
in which he describes a hallucinatory tired vision which can be traced throughout his

See Han’s chapter “The End of Theory” in The Agony of Eros: “Not long ago, Chris
Anderson—the editor-in-chief of Wired—published a provocative article entitled “The
End of Theory.” In it, he claimed that the inconceivably large volumes of data now
available have made theoretical models entirely superfluous […] There is no such thing
as data-driven thinking. Only calculation is data driven. The negativity of the
incalculable is inscribed in thinking. As such, it is prior and superordinate to ‘data,’
which means ‘things given’” (48-9).
19
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oeuvre as inspiration. Staring at a false mahogany panel, Ernst describes fantastical
scenes that engage with a “well-known game of purely optical representations which
obsesses us in half-sleep” to find visual possibilities that affected him “for a long time
afterward” (Beyond Painting 4). Much like Han’s use of ‘optics,’ his ‘visions of halfsleep’ are shifts in perception and ways of thinking much more than they are actually
about sight. Normally, seeing such things as Ernst discovers with tired vision would be
buried under fully awake interpretations of the world that are limited to rational
understandings.
In order to see tired vision at work, we should turn to one of Ernst’s earliest
collages as it offers a unique pivot point for our two forms of optics, immunological and
(inter)neuronal. Murdering Airplane (1920) is inextricably attached to the First World
War and its immunological consequences, though in Ernst’s depiction there exists an
(inter)neuronal way of perceiving that does not necessitate the attack-and-defense
disposition of the immunological.
Undoubtedly, Ernst and the Dadaists attacked many things. The methodology of
collage is itself a revolt against painting by doing away with the paint brush and the skill
of rendering an image with careful study. As Raoul Hausmann said about the
development of photomontage,
the first to practice photomontage, the Dadaists, shared the viewpoint—
unshakably for them—that wartime painting, postfuturist expressionism, had
failed because of its non-objectivity (its choice of the non-figural), its lack of
engagement, and its conceptual vacuum, and that not only painting but all genres
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and all artistic techniques needed a radical transformation to bring them in contact
with the life of the era. (Hausmann and Cullars 67)
Similarly, André Breton said, “the invention of photography has dealt a mortal blow to
the old modes of expression, in painting as well as poetry […] we do not hesitate to see in
Max Ernst a man of these infinite possibilities” (Beyond Painting 177). Collage as it
differs from photomontage instead steals from the world of mass-produced images in
order to construct itself as a hybrid, which Han believes is a symbol of contemporary life.
He refers to this state as a “general promiscuity” in the “absence of immunological
effective[ness].” “Hybridization—which dominates not just current culture-theoretical
discourse, but also the feeling of life in general—stands diametrically opposed to
immunization. Immunological hyperaesthesis would not allow hybridization to occur in
the first place” (The Burnout Society 3). But, in Murdering Airplane we find no explicit
imagery of immune defense; rather, we find collaboration in Ernst’s methodology. Unlike
many of the other Dada collages, Ernst’s images come together in unity instead of a
disjointed mass, as exemplified in the collages of Raoul Hausmann or George Grosz.20
Regardless of who made it, collage works are read as an image in which its diverse parts
work together as a whole. This cannot be explained within an immunological paradigm
nor with Han’s use of ‘neuronal’ as it refers to movement and stimulus. It must be
explained in terms of connectivity and interneurons.
Moving beyond the methodology of collage and toward the image itself, there is a
strong implied narrative of conflict, if for no other reason than the title, Murdering

Hannah Höch’s work also bears the same kind of artistry and skill as Ernst. Both artists
composed aesthetically pleasing work, which, contrasts what many of the Dadaists
intentionally avoided.
20
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Airplane. The airplane itself sits at the center of the image. The plane appears to be
metamorphizing into what Francis Picabia called the ‘mechanomorph,’ a human machine
hybrid with human arms whose shoulders bump the front of the plane into a crooked
position. This imbues the front of the plane, as it sits on human shoulders, with the
quality of a head. Meanwhile, in the bottom left corner of the image, two soldiers carry
their wounded, legless comrade out of frame. The landscape behind them is completely
barren and grey. All human features have a yellow tinge while the environment and plane
are colourless.
Presumably, the injured soldier was injured by the ‘murdering airplane.’ But,
upon closer inspection, the soldiers do not seem rushed as might be expected of a victim
so closer to its attacker. The soldiers do not grimace or worry either. There is a tangible
sadness, but they are not running in fear from the murdering airplane. Instead, they
slowly wander off. In fact, it appears as though they may be standing still, taking a break
from their labour and duty. The plane itself appears to writhe in mid-air or perhaps dance
or maybe even sleep. The position of the arms and ‘head’ suggest the posture of lying
down. The direction and gestures of the plane lead away from the soldiers. This
mechanical creature appears self-interested, leading one to believe any harm it may have
caused was likely unintentional and indifferent. This, I imagine, done in the same manner
as a sleeper knocking over a glass while in bed. In this way, the same action can be
described as an attack on a glass of water or soldiers as easily as an inadvertent gesture
made while wrapped in ‘half-sleep.’
Moving our attention to the background we find no barricades or pits blasted into
the ground by shells, just a smooth expanse of grey. Though the airplane is certainly
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meant to be understood as the Other, which is an unavoidable part of Ernst’s thinking
appearing often in his writing and artwork, it also appears as the Self. Ernst’s interest in
psychology cannot be ignored here.21 The manifestation of this murdering airplane should
be understood as psychological. Its representation leaning heavily toward what we might
assume the perception of tired soldiers would manifest as they looked up from their
trenches toward humming grey skies. An experience Ernst likely had while serving at the
Western front between July 1915 and March 1916 before sustaining a head injury from
the recoil of his own gun (appropriately neuronal).22
Murdering Airplane’s ambiguous movements are enigmatic, escaping any
concrete answers or intentions. Mystery like this does not fall within the neuronal
framework of positivity or the hyper. However, the distinction between Han’s modes
begin to blur somewhere in this airplane. The psychological horror is equally spectacle.
Though, the soldiers do not seem rushed nor interested in combat. The psychological
manifestation Ernst has rendered here balances between the two modalities depending on
which optics we apply to it. (Inter)neuronal optics and tired vision encourage us to see the
tiredness and depression depicted while being able to draw connections between the
parts. Between the soldiers and the plane, between the landscape and figures, between the
artwork, its historical context and we as spectators (inter)neuronal optics observes the
interconnected nature of these elements. Immunological optics, on the other hand, will
find conflict between the soldiers and their ‘murderer,’ between the human and machine

21

Ernst studied psychology at Bonn University until the outbreak of World War I.
In fairness, this was not the extent of Ernst’s military career. In his own biographical
notes published in Beyond Painting, Ernst refers to his military service extending from
1914–1918 in bland terms. “Boredom of military life and warfare. Very little work” (vii).
22
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parts of the airplane as they cause the arms to writhe in pain, between the historical
context and the landscape as a desolate war-torn battlefield. Both perspectives hold equal
merit in Murdering Airplane.
In sum, both ‘optics’ have a specific role to play. Immunological optics allows for
the capacity to see conflict, suffering and injury as exhibited in Ernst’s collage.
(Inter)neuronal optics offers a playful eye for learning more about the systemic issues
that we reproduce in ourselves. As Han, Handke, Crary and Ernst suggest, tiredness
offers the opportunity to see differently in a profound sense without necessitating injury.
We can wonder with tired eyes at the soldiers’ ability to come together in the midst of a
multitude of afflictions. We can see the fantastic half-sleep imagery of the airplane that
itself appears to be caught between the posture of sleep and an Other-worldly dance.
Applying a (inter)neuronal optics, which escapes the ‘bingewatching’ limitations of
Han’s motor and sensory neurons, to Murdering Airplane opens the possibility to see the
Other—the deathly airplane—as more than an enemy, other than Other, but a fellow
sufferer, an engineering wonder of humanity somehow managing to stay aloft in the air,
or a dress caught by the energies of the wind. (Inter)neuronal optics encourages us to see
the afflictions we suffer from today, not as conflict, but as excess. Dada’s interest in
excess displays an awareness of the ‘neuronal’ one hundred years earlier than Han’s
writings, but with a flexibility Han claims we have now lost. Not only more optimistic
than Han, Dada’s tiredness with negativity moves toward seeing the possibility for
fantasy in the here and now, in the details, in the excess positivity of the ways things are
interconnected, rather than in conflict with one another.
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The Excess Positivity of Possibilism: Marcel Duchamp, Possibility and the Affliction
of Too Much
Traditionally speaking, that is, immunologically speaking, our immunological optics have
provided us a sense of direction. The possibility of the future has depended on
overcoming the limitations of today. Perhaps the future will be different, if we overcome
the limitations of the present, from which a sense of progress may emerge. Though, as
Marcel Duchamp puts it, “progress is merely an enormous pretension on our part,”
because, at least for art, what we refer to as progress is only the shifting tides of “fashion”
and taste (Essential Writings 123). This is an (inter)neuronal perspective, which puts all
artistic forms of expression and fantasy in relation to one another as alternative possible
forms that do not negate or conflict but exist alongside as playful, possible techniques.
However, the multiplicity of alternative forms of expression creates a problem of
‘too much,’ which writer and film maker Hito Steyerl has referred to as “the shrapnel of
former images” that “covers the surface of the world” (Steyerl 18). The plethora of
possible images halt our access to a strong sense of an actual world. Fragments of
images, or more accurately, interpretations, which require a learned understanding of
what such images mean, afflict us with depressing knowledge such that one style or
fashion does not necessarily have more access to the real than any other. Duchamp saw
this early on while living in a world that “was forever changing and becoming
increasingly unstable, a world in which all hope of certainty and lasting values was
fading rapidly, all these painters [Kandinsky, Kupka, Mondrian, Malevich] were striving
to discover in art a truth which was timeless, irrefutable, eternal […] Duchamp’s idea
went in exactly the opposite direction” (Molderings 16). Moreover, each subjective
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experience of a fashion (or an image) cannot be relied upon to create a consistent
meaning amongst multiple people. This is, in part, what I believe Richard Huelsenbeck
meant by his famous claim that art is forever “picking up the pieces from yesterday’s
crash” (Huelsenbeck 40). As a result, it would be unfortunate, truly, to see those pieces as
something to be put back together again as they once were. Instead, 'yesterday’s crash’
provides us with the building blocks of today, if we use (inter)neuronal optics as a means
of seeing the world playfully. Failing to do so only makes us implicit in
misunderstanding a fundamentally fragmented reality. Neuronal affliction, then, is a
pressing concern as it originates directly from the misattribution of an immunological
response to neuronal systems, which fold our attention and energies back onto ourselves,
recreating our pain. We can see such a misattribution specifically in the resistance to
Duchamp’s Fountain (1917) existing as both art and object.
When he submitted Fountain to The First Exhibition of the Society of
Independent Artists (often referred to, in short, as the ‘Independents show’) we can now,
using our understanding of immunological and (inter)neuronal optics, see the neuronal
clashing with the immunological. His submission, and the first appearance of the
readymade, was intended to test the Independents’ inclusive vision of staging an
exhibition without a jury. The controversy this caused has since become a significant, if
not the most significant, moment in twentieth century art history. For our purposes, this is
because of the readymade’s unique expression of the possible. His so-called ‘possiblism’
lacks the negativity and limit of the impossible.
This same idea repeatedly appears in Han’s writings as he distinguishes between
the ‘Can’ and the ‘Should,’ modal verbs that emphasize the possibility or impossibility of
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action. The proliferation of possibilities in Duchamp’s work collides with the actual,
material world, oversaturating it with neuronal connections causing affliction that,
curiously, are mixed with immunological features. Such a mixture does not exist in Han’s
writing and merits some exploration. Duchamp is particularly useful for addressing this
gap in Han’s thought because of the controversy his readymades produced, first exhibited
in 1917. I argue, it is because of the readymade’s immanent possibilities clashing with
immunological ideology, which states something such as art should remain fixed within a
limited definition, that these artworks have persisted as a relevant topic for research and
development.
We will work through the unique positivity and presentism of Duchamp’s
‘possibilism’ and Han’s negative beauty to understand why possibilism ‘burns away
aesthetics.’ Although Han’s negative beauty is a retreat from actually addressing his new
‘paradigm’ of positivity, there are similarities between his thought and Duchamp’s when
it comes to the experience of time. The erotic concealment Han outlines, as opposed to
pornographic exposure, creates a point of contemplation unfolding over time for the
viewer, something more cerebral, which we find again in Duchamp as ‘delay’ and
‘indecisive reunion.’ Delay differs drastically from Han’s erotic concealment. It is
constructed from excess positivity. However, the erotic—eros—offers us a way of
understanding the mechanism at work in Duchamp’s conception of the creative act. Eros
is invigorating force that bridges the divide between Self and Other, allowing them to
work together rather than seeking to destroy one another. This is of radical importance
for Duchamp’s understanding of art and begins to explain how the gap that exists
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between Self and Other has been filled in, when the two have not been merged as
described in the first chapter.
Duchamp introduced the simple act of choice as the primary medium of all
artists. This reduction, of course, enraged many of his contemporaries and created the
controversy that made Fountain not just famous, but infamous. But what likely made it
even more difficult for them was the flexibility of decision this choice brought with it.
Consequently, the neuronal affliction of ‘too much’ becomes all too evident as the urinalFountain can just as easily belong in the bathroom as the gallery, and back again! This,
put plainly, is just too much.

Possibility
In a note from 1913 Duchamp writes:
Possible
The figuration of a possible.
(not as the opposite of impossible
nor as related to probable
nor as subordinated to likely)

the possible is only
a physical “caustic” [vitriol type]
burning up all aesthetics or callistics. (Essential Writings 73)
Duchamp’s possible has nothing to do with prediction, which relates to probability and
likeliness. It is not concerned with what might happen in any actual sense. For this
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reason, it differs from Derrida’s ‘perhaps,’ which describes a potential future, “there will
come, perhaps; there will occur, perhaps, the event of that which arrives” (Derrida 28).
Duchampian possibility lives in the present as a field of possible choices. Its antithesis,
the impossible, has been detached and extracted. Actuality is also burnt away as the
impossible surrounds the actual, limiting it to one rather than many.
This is more closely related to Bergson’s understanding of the possible as a
“preparation for the art of living” (Bergson 112). I would hesitate to attach this too
readily to a preparation for the future simply because art, as a skillful and intuitive
activity (not in a Bergsonian sense), cannot contain the future without becoming
mechanized, therefore, losing its artfulness. In this way, possibility does not precede the
real, but comes from it. Bergson warns that to interpret possibility as preceding the real is
an illusion we create from retrospectively identifying causes that lead to the real, such as
the unique contexts that produced an artist capable to creating a significant artwork like
the readymade; rather, “it is the real which makes itself possible, and not the possible
which becomes real” (Bergson 111). In other words, an object’s possibility for becoming
an artwork does not make it an artwork alone. This is important for locating Duchamp’s
possibility within other discussions, but this text is not meant to be a rumination on
Duchamp’s relationship with Bergson.23 What stands out between Bergson, Derrida and
Duchamp’s conceptions of possibility is Duchamp’s ‘presentness.’24 The presentness of
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There is certainly a relationship to be drawn between Duchamp and Bergson. Roughly
contemporary with one another, they grapple with many of the same issues prevalent at
that time. At minimum, Bergson influenced Duchamp’s thoughts on space and time. See
Frederico Luisetti’s “Reflections of Duchamp: Bergson Readymade.”
24
For more on Dada’s general relationship with presentism see Maria Stavrinaki’s Dada
Presentism.
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possibilism serves to emphasize a lack of negativity as it focuses on an overflowing of
the moment, not as it comes from the moments beforehand nor as it rolls into the next,
but as it exists now. The readymade’s possibility is excessively positive as it captures too
many options for an object now.

Beauty
This possibility is an ungrounded and excessively positive notion of possibility that
‘burns up’ the negativity of aesthetics and callistics. Han provides us with a sense of why
that might be. He goes to great lengths to describe beauty as dependent on the negative
primarily because it engages the mind and plays with negativity in the form of
concealment. “Concealment is essential to beauty […] Pornography—as nakedness
without any drapes, without any secrets—is the opposite figure to beauty” (Saving Beauty
27). Pornography, for Han, quite simply, stands in opposition to beauty because nothing
about it is hidden or maintains any form of depth; “Pornography has no interiority,
hiddenness, or mystery” (The Transparency Society 26). In Han’s words, “beauty is a
hideout” (Saving Beauty 27) or, as Kant might say, the negativity of concealment
generates a ‘free play of the faculties.’ Ironically, Han locates play within the realm of
pornography, which is not only an oversight of the mechanisms of play but also a clear
give away that Han’s conception of beauty is more a consideration of callistics than
aesthetics. Although he very briefly and intermittently touches on art,25 his main interest

It is interesting to note that Han’s primary touch stone for art in Saving Beauty is Jeff
Koons; “Jeff Koons, arguably the most successful living artist at present, is a master of
smooth surfaces” (2), the ‘smooth’ being a primary concept for Han denoting the lack of
a ‘rough’ Other. Koons also happens to take extensively from Duchamp’s readymades. In
the loosely paraphrased words of David Hopkins from his exhibition Dada’s Boys, Koons
25
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is the experience of beauty itself. The ‘caustic’ nature of possibility eats away at both
because it lacks negativity. In this way, something that is truly beautiful should impact
us, both in the literal and figurative sense. The possibility of revolution does not move us
in the way revolution itself does. This is not a situation of merely liking or of pleasure,
but something that cuts much deeper and only reveals its beauty over time upon
reflection.
Duchamp’s ‘antiretinal’ artwork suggests a similar approach in which a ‘delay’ is
produced. Creating some friction between artwork and spectator, a hesitation appears in
the interpretive process, causing an extension beyond a mere picture’s aesthetics into
contemplation. “It’s merely a way of succeeding in no longer thinking that the thing in
question is a picture—to make a delay of it in the most general way possible, not so much
in the different meaning in which delay can be taken, but rather in their indecisive
reunion” (Essential Writings 26). Duchamp’s concept of ‘delay’ is likely to be most well
known in relation to his work The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even (1915–
23), also commonly referred to as the Large Glass, a work literally made on glass. To
take this artwork as a point of reference for a moment, the indecisive reunion he aims to
produce in ‘delay’ can, in very base and physical terms, be described as a merging of the
images on glass with the images, textures and objects that inevitably appear
simultaneously alongside it, through the glass. Of course, it must be mentioned that
Duchamp’s concept is more complex that this simple description, but by intermingling art
and life through his Large Glass a delay is created, at least for a moment, in which some

returned the readymade to the store Duchamp bought it from, specifically displaying
various kinds of vacuums, basketballs and advertisements for their branding.
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questions may be asked; which part is the art? Is it all art? Intentionally so? And,
unavoidably, what does it all mean? It is in this way that Duchamp imagined possibility,
or should I say, it is through an indecisive reunion that possibilities are forcibly brought
to our attention in a moment of delay. Oversaturating and overdetermining an object, an
artwork, a moment to the point of ambiguity, Duchamp’s possibility is excessively
positive. Though, in contrast to Han’s conception of beauty, which requires negativity
and concealment, Duchamp encourages contemplation through an overexposure to
possibilities that disrupt quick (retinal) consumption.

The Creative Act
Duchamp wrote his note on possibility the same year he chose and assembled his first
readymade, Bicycle Wheel (1913), an ‘assisted readymade.’ The readymade, by intention,
was just an object to think with and to be ‘distracted’ by. As Duchamp notoriously
describes it, he just “had the happy idea to fasten a bicycle wheel to a kitchen stool and
watch it turn” (Essential Writings 141). His first readymade served as a point of curious
fixation—something for a “long and slow gaze” (The Burnout Society 21). Thus,
Duchamp’s readymades are objects of thought that shed light on Duchamp’s turn away
from aesthetics and ‘retinal’ art, which he felt was a shallow experience meant only for
the eye.
Painting, in particular, had forgotten its more cerebral roots in religion,
philosophy and morals, as Duchamp states in an interview: “Since Courbet, it’s been
believed that painting is addressed to the retina. That was everyone’s error” (Cabanne
43). Prioritizing the eye in art produces pornographic depictions in which everything is
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accessible without delay, no possibility for fantasy. Of course, pornography and fantasy
are often tied together, but this fantasy is the fantasy developed in the last chapter that
exists in the here and now. Pornography’s full exposure only leaves room for an
imagining that expands into somewhere else in which things are different, we are
different, really outright Other than we are. The fantasy of delay must be found stemming
from what is present in the way Bergson says, “it is the real which makes itself possible.”
The real experience of indecision in which we see multiple possible interpretations
slipping around an object fulfils this present-possibility. It was only through Duchamp’s
tired vision, looking to his (I imagine lazily) spinning bicycle wheel, that he eventually
came to see a possibility for it as art. There was a delay between its creation and its
nomination as artwork. Though, crucially, the possibility of the readymade artwork did
not consciously pre-exist the object itself, nor does its status as artwork require things to
be other than they are.
We can see in Duchamp’s construction of the creative act a form of possibility as
it exists within Han’s immunological and neuronal frameworks. It merges the two
modalities. To understand how the creative act brings together the immunological and the
neuronal we must return to Han’s argument for eros, though this time from another book
and a more successful interpretation.
In The Agony of Eros, Han shows the erotic is more than love and sex, but
vitality. It brings life close to death and the Self close to the Other. It simultaneously
maintains and dissolves the threshold between the Self and Other. Because of this, eros is
immunological, and it contains a tendency toward the neuronal through an abandonment
of the immunological’s ‘military dispositive’ toward attack and defense techniques.
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Essentially, it acknowledges the threshold between the Self and Other while
simultaneously desiring to bridge it. For this reason, eros adds “vitality and turmoil” to
thought, which in turn creates new possible thoughts. Given the arguments presented in
The Agony of Eros, ‘turmoil,’ here, should be understood with emphasis on the
turbulence that can similarly be found in Duchamp’s ‘indecisive reunion’ rather than the
more violent ‘turmoil’ of revolt and ‘revolutions’ that aim to clash and overcome (as
opposed to spinning). Eros’ disruptive, yet connective nature is both immunological and
neuronal. It connects the inside with the outside and the Self with the Other. “Without
eros, thinking is merely repetitive and additive,” amounting to what Han fears is empty
‘calculation’ (The Agony of Eros 48). “Unlike calculation, thinking gathers experience by
transforming and by making other” (Topology of Violence 99). It creates something new,
something Other; it deviates. The negativity that exists within eros keeps thought from
simply adding up, rather it dances and plays, producing new possibilities that are not
limited to the projected outcomes of calculation. In fact, often existing completely outside
the linear progression of calculation. Instead eros makes connections in unpredictable and
seemingly illogical ways. It “pulls the subject out of itself, toward the Other,” which
“makes possible experience of the Other’s otherness” (The Agony of Eros 3). The Other’s
involvement in thought produces unknown results. Without eros and without the Other,
the production of new possibilities, new options, new choices—that are, coexisting and
overdetermined in the field of Duchampian possibility—is impossible.
I should make clear that the relation about to be described in and through the
creative act, its dependency on the Other, is only marginally neuronal. It cooperates with
the Other, like eros, instead of trying to destroy it. This is a meaningful shift away from a
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purely immunological mode supposedly defining the twentieth century, even though
Duchamp describes it as a ‘struggle.’ Duchamp writes, “In the creative act, the artist goes
from intention to realization through a chain of totally subjective reactions […] The result
of this struggle is a difference between the intention and its realization, a difference
which the artist is not aware of” (Essential Writings 139). The obscurity of the artist’s
subjective choices to themselves, while making an artwork, is parallel to Han’s
description of the effects of eros. The results of the artist’s work have deviated from the
artist’s original intentions as they intuitively respond the material in front of them,
changing with each new adjustment of colour or brush stroke and even the choice to
simply put an object on display. This is tired fantasy at work.
There is, however, another stage in the creative act which is far more
controversial. After the artist ‘completes’ their work it is “still in a raw state, which must
be ‘refined’ as pure sugar from molasses, by the spectator” (Essential Writings 139). Just
as the artist had ‘subjective reactions’ so too does the spectator. In this way a field of
possibilities appears between the artist, their artwork and the spectator. Duchamp refers
to this as a “gap.” Without the interpretive gap between the artist and spectator no
possibility for possibility can exist. If the intention of an artist amounted to the reception
of their artwork, interpretation and thought would be pointless and without effect. The
shared effort between the artist and spectator requires the experience of the “Other’s
otherness” made accessible by eros to generate meaning. Julian Jason Haladyn explains
in his paper “On the Creative Act” that “on its most basic level ‘The Creative Act’ is
Duchamp’s recognition and articulation of this gap between the artist’s intentions and the
end result of the work as experienced by the spectator (and posterity)” (“On ‘The
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Creative Act’ ”). Haladyn mentions posterity in brackets because it is a temporal
consequence of spectation. Over time the interpretations of the individual spectators
amount to posterity, which raises subjective choices to canon.
Duchamp became aware of the gap in spectatorships, as it were, through the
different responses his work received when shown in France compared to the United
States. The shifting response between the two spectating communities “represented a key
turning point in his career. When this same painting [Nude Descending a Staircase, No. 2
(1912)] was submitted a year before to the 1912 Salon des Indépendants it was regarded
so poorly that Duchamp’s brothers, on behalf of the organizers, asked him to change the
painting” (“On ‘The Creative Act’ ”). The same work went on to exhibit in the Armory
Show where he was lauded as a symbol of modern art, gaining great success in America
and eventually encouraging him to move to New York two years later. This radical shift
in reception is unavoidably due to the main variable in the situation: the spectator. The
art-object, then, is not an expression of an artist’s intentions so much as it serves as an
initial point of generation for possible interpretations. A field of possible interpretations
ooze from the artwork to be picked up and refined by the spectator.
The gap between intentions and interpretation refines possibility into individual,
subjective meanings. Duchamp’s brilliance shines particularly bright in the creative act
with his added concept of posterity. In this way, Duchamp’s conception of the creative
act necessarily involves a collaborative effort on two levels, individually and collectively,
in order to refine the plurality of possibility to a single actuality, which can also referred
to as art history. The individual artist cannot predict the reception of their artwork on
their own. Haladyn acknowledges this in his book, Étant donnés (2010), on Duchamp’s
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final work, Étant Donnés: 1° la chute d'eau / 2° le gaz d'éclairage (in English, Given: 1.
The Waterfall, 2. The Illuminating Gas) (1936–66), saying:
Spectators participate in the creative act through their fulfilment of the
possibilities Duchamp stages, a co-partnering that is taken to an extreme in the
intermingling of real and imagined perceptions. For this reason what we are
presented with is not the real but the possible, because the possible, according to
Duchamp, implies ‘the becoming—the passage from/one to the other.’ (Etant
Donnes 61).
As Haladyn outlines, Duchampian possibility depends on a bridge between the Self and
Other. Meaning created from interacting with art cannot be summed up in the artist’s
intentions alone. The interpretive process of the creative act is never actually what it
‘should’ be in terms of what the artist wanted, but always slightly—unpredictably—
askew from what was intended. There is always a necessary gap between the artist,
artwork and spectator filled with possible interpretations. As Bergson said, reality is
“fullness constantly swelling out, to which emptiness is unknown” (Bergson 101). This
fullness appears to be something we can no longer ignore, filling in all the spaces in
between with indecisive reunions and ambiguity. In this way, knowledge of these
slippery possibilities crushes out negativity and, thinking back to the first chapter, room
for rest or relaxation. Indeed, tired vision and playful observation have difficulty working
here as well, as long as possibility is seen as something that we can ‘get ahead of,’ which
is precisely what Bergson warns is an illusion. The possible does not lead to the real. It is
only after that we look toward the past, searching for the (inevitable) events leading to the
real outcome that we see the possible there, preparing to become the real.
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Choice
Now is perhaps a good time to consider how choice interacts with possibility and to take
a closer look at the readymade. First, it is important to summarize the context in which
the readymade was first exhibited:
The First Exhibition of the Society of Independent Artists opened at the Grand
Central Palace on the evening of April 10, 1917. Thousands gathered to celebrate
the largest art exhibition ever held in New York, almost twice the size of the
famous Armory Show four years earlier [… it] contained 2,125 works of painting
and sculpture (New York Dada 177).
The Independents show intended to share with the public the then-contemporary state of
American art. It was a response to a growing perception of an immunological opacity that
existed between the galleries and exhibitions of the time, limiting a comprehensive view
of contemporary art, which we should recognize as a neuronal impulse toward inclusivity
and transparency.26 This was seen as a problem after the Armory Show in 1913 which
exposed the American public to the burgeoning modern art movements in Europe.
The Independents’ primary intention was the dissolution of barriers that kept the
diverse array of artistic styles separate. As a result, the exhibition was massive. Francis
Naumann in his chronicling of the Independents Show noted the public’s “most
consistent objection was aimed at the immense size of the exhibition itself, which [the
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Transparency is a key concept for Han that was discussed in the first chapter. In short,
it is the tendency toward open-access and clarity that smoothes and speeds exchange of
capital and information. Han argues that this is a central feature to the achievementsubject’s ‘auto-exploitation’ as they willingly expose themselves and empty out the
private sphere to reduce negativity in the form of opacity.
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spectators] found physically exhausting” (New York Dada 188). By responding to the
growing desire for visibility of all the schools of artistic practice at that time the
Independents were beginning to erode the opaque limits they felt capped artistic freedom
and financial success. To accomplish this, the Independents advertised the exhibition as
juryless, instead opting for admission upon membership and the payment of a fee.
Theoretically, this provided a space lacking the negativity of exclusion and opacity. As
the Independents say in their catalogue,
No one exhibition at present gives an idea of contemporary American art in its
ensemble, or permits comparisons of the various directions it is taking […] this
exhibition will make it possible to form an idea of the state of contemporary art.
No such survey could be obtained from a dozen visits to the exhibitions of former
years, when none could claim to be thoroughly representative. (Independents
Catalogue)
That is, the Independents sought to produce a neuronal space of over stimulation,
transparency and information. In practice, it produced an exhausting experience of
excess.
Their call for artwork claimed all artwork submitted with the payment of a
member’s fee would be included. This reasonably assumed submissions would come
from artists (they certainly did not expect submissions from plumbers).27 Duchamp’s
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In the second issue of The Blind Man, a publication founded and supported by Beatrice
Wood for the sake of “justifying the Fountain-Urinal” (Cabanne 56), a notorious line
appears in a short article attributed to Duchamp: “The only works of art America has
given are her plumbing and her bridges” (“The Richard Mutt Case” 154). Similarly,
Marsden Hartley, who painted The Warriors, which served as the backdrop for Fountain
in its infamous photograph by Alfred Stieglitz, said plumbers are “creators of aesthetic
delights” (Camfield 64).
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submission of a urinal under a pseudonym tested the committee’s resolve to their own
rules. The majority of whom wanted to exclude the object from the show, fearing it was a
prank. The call for artwork was intended for an interior community of ‘artists’ largely
defined by their hand-crafted objects that had a clear exterior Other of mass production.
The immunological status of the exhibition was complicated by the Society’s
presentation of inclusivity, equality and, in the words of their guiding inspiration, Jean
Auguste Dominique Ingres, “unlimited admission” (Independents Catalogue). This is,
undeniably, a neuronal aim from an immunological standpoint. When the Independents
were confronted with the industrial cast urinal as an artwork their interest in accepting all
forms of artistic expression faltered. In this way, Fountain challenged the neuronal aim of
the Independents, drawing out the limits of their inclusive assumptions and causing the
jury to refuse to exhibit a submission from a supposedly non-juried exhibition.
The non-exclusion of Fountain resulted in scandal. Duchamp’s use of massproduced objects as artwork fulfilled a Dadaist interest in drawing together art and life.
The sacred and exclusive character of art is by nature immunological, especially at the
beginning of the twentieth century. The readymade artwork exposed the constructed
nature of art by reducing the artist’s role to the choice of an object and, at most, the
addition of a signature. He was arguing that all artwork is fundamentally a choice or
series of choices by an artist. As Duchamp purportedly wrote supporting the inclusion of
Fountain in the exhibition: “Whether Mr Mutt [the pseudonym Duchamp used to submit
Fountain] with his own hands made the fountain or not has no importance. He CHOSE it.
He took an ordinary article of life, placed it so that its useful significance disappeared

81

under the new title and point of view—created a new thought for that object” (“The
Richard Mutt Case” 154).
In Duchamp’s view, it was not the craftsmanship of an object which made it art
but the inventive choice of its presentation that ‘created a new thought for that object.’
Emphasizing contemplation and a slow, tired gaze, Duchamp makes it clear that his
definition of art depends on the neuronal in the most basic sense. Indeed, the readymades
were initially thought experiments, not art, as he says explicitly to Pierre Cabanne:
Please note that I didn’t want to make a work of art out of it. The word
‘readymade’ did not appear until 1915, when I went to the United States. It was
an interesting word, but when I put a bicycle wheel on a stool, the fork down,
there was no idea of a ‘readymade,’ or anything else. It was just a distraction. I
didn’t have any special reason to do it or any intention of showing it, or
describing anything. No, nothing like all that… (Cabanne 47)
The development of the readymades grew from an (inter)neuronal optics. Duchamp had
watched the spin of the bicycle wheel simply for its ‘distraction.’ The various objects
Duchamp would go on to collect in his New York studio continue to emphasize the
neuronal features of the readymade as they “went largely unnoticed” (Marcel Duchamp
72). The readymades, understandably, would be nearly invisible to an immunological
optics. They were merely objects, lacking any attack and defense. They were void of
conflict, opinion, or the pang of beauty before Duchamp posed his challenge to the
Independents’ commitment and their inclusive art exhibition.
The readymade fit perfectly into the ‘blind spot’ of the immunological as it
emphasizes the nominal quality of art Duchamp had come to strongly believe in. Each
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readymade is indifferent to its status as art or object, it simply takes the linguistic
categories we apply to it. This is particularly well exemplified in the story recounted by
George Heard Hamilton of when he and Katherine Dreier staged an exhibition of
Duchamp’s work at Yale in 1945. When the exhibition toured to a museum in Minnesota
a janitor mistook In Advance of a Broken Arm as an ordinary shovel. Without complaint
or combat the readymade becomes an artwork upon its labelling as such, ready at a
moment’s notice to once again become an object. Once an object it can revert back to an
artwork without pause.
Importantly, the challenge presented by Fountain is not an immunological
opposition from the Other, but an internal infarction Duchamp carefully frames within
the history of art. After travelling in 1912 to the museums of Basel, Munich, Berlin,
Dresden, Leipzig, Prague and Vienna Duchamp realized that art had a long history tied to
intellectual stimulation rather than what he recognized as the modern tendency toward
purely retinal stimulation. Duchamp’s tour of many of the Western world’s masterpieces
marks a notable turn in his approach to art. Duchamp explains that his aim as an artist
became something that “consists in a combination, or at least in an expression, which
only the grey cells can reproduce” (Alain Jouffroy’s “Conversation avec Marcel
Duchamp” quoted by Molderings 16–7). To do this he purposely disrupted the
preconceived notions of what art meant and what it could be, which he felt were
fundamentally nominalist. Rather than attempting to find a stable and consistent
description to define art, Duchamp recognized the socially conditioned and unstable
nature of it. By posing readymade objects as artwork he drew attention to the always
present possibility of art upon the designation of an object as artwork, which turns
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Duchamp’s challenge inward toward the spectator’s subjective decision to name
something as an artwork as they see fit.
To frame this challenge within Hanian language, what does art look like without
the Other, a fundamentally stable definition or the exclusionary boundaries of art and
non-art? This is significant because it draws attention to a need for flexibility that the
Dadaists, and Duchamp in particular, captured so well in their playfulness. Their
readiness to do away with society’s expected meanings and replace them with “nothing.”
For Duchamp, this is a question we must continually and individually judge. Upon each
questioning we tear down the immunological wall between art and object to then build it
up again in a continual re-play, akin to setting up the pieces of a chess board again and
again after each game. Within this repetition conflict becomes meaningless. Death and
destruction have no consequence. The opposing black and white pieces are both caught in
the same loop. It only makes sense to refer to them as opposing within a certain distance
before they both become part of the same game. Similarly, upon each judgement we
reconstruct an illusionary veil that reduces the possibility of what art can be to what it
should be, to an actuality. This urinal is art; it is Fountain, but it is still a urinal.
Similar to the playing out of a chess match only to be reset at the end of the game,
the readymade performs a strange folding back into itself, somewhat like a mobius strip,
between the neuronal possibility of what can and the immunological limits of what
should be. The readymade can be art or object, but any engagements we individually or
collectively make with it define what it should be, at least for a moment. For this reason,
the readymade encourages an (inter)neuronal engagement which keeps an open-minded
willingness to revaluate the object’s definition. The readymade is an indecisive reunion,

84

too full and overdetermined, but intentionally so. In contrast, the neuronal optics Han
presents, or ‘bingewatching,’ is a passive acceptance of whatever nomination might be
applied to a urinal or other objects, thereby reducing its possible interpretations to one:
whatever we are told.

Decision
The alleged indecency of this object forced artists and members of the general
public alike to confront the obvious philosophical issues raised by an artist who,
upon the placement of his signature, assumed the near godlike power of
transforming a pristine, mass-produced object into a unique work of art—even if,
in the end, viewers chose to exclude it from the realm of aesthetic consideration.
(New York Dada 46)
As Naumann notes, spectators of Fountain and the Independents who ‘rejected’ it from
their exhibition believed they could choose one interpretation of the object. Of course,
this decisive move to “supress” Fountain, as Duchamp put it, was unsuccessful (Cabanne
55). Maintained within a small group of artists and friends of Duchamp after the
controversy with the Independents, the possibility of a urinal-as-art resurfaced thirty
years later eventually garnering Duchamp as ‘an-artist,’ par excellence, as he preferred to
be titled, influencing much of the artistic production in American in the 1960s and after.
By 2004, Duchamp’s Fountain was named the most influential piece of modern art—
quite the comeback for a supposedly extinguished possibility.28

28

See “Duchamp’s urinal tops art survey” BBC NEWS.
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The decision presented by Fountain is misleading, etymologically implying a
negation or separation from other possibilities. Decision, as in de-caedere, its Latin root,
means to ‘cut off.’ Deciding between possibilities, that is, making a choice and
actualizing that choice has the distinct quality of immunological exclusion. However, the
decision present in Duchamp’s Fountain is not exclusionary. It does not cut off other
possibilities. It holds on to them, looping back around, continuously and exhaustingly.
Fountain, for Duchamp, is just as much a urinal as it ever was. It is continually both. In
fact, Duchamp offers us a better word than ‘decision.’ Arbitration, in the sense of
negotiation rather than its more decisive connection with ‘judgement,’ navigates differing
views peacefully, without destruction.29 As a practice it sees similarities in order to
bridge difference. It opens up conversation in order to understand and work together. The
choice spectators make in relation to Fountain is an arbitration between the object, its
context and our taste.
As Katherine Dreier notes in a letter to Duchamp, attempting to smooth relations
after the fallout of Fountain’s suppression from the Independents Show, she was looking
for arbitration: “I did not see anything pertaining to originality in it; that does not mean
that if my attention had been drawn to what was original by those who could see it, that I
could not also have seen it” (Camfield 30). Dreier wanted Duchamp to return to the
Independents committee, which he had been a founding member of, to arbitrate between
the perspectives simultaneously available in the Fountain-urinal. She saw that the

Duchamp preferred the title of ‘generator-arbitrator’ instead of ‘curator’ for both the
International Exhibition of Surrealism in 1938 and the First Papers of Surrealism in
1942.
29
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decision present in the readymade can be returned to, readdressed and rehashed as it has
been over the last century by many theorists and artists alike.30
The possibility of Fountain as a urinal is just as present after a decision that it is
artwork as it ever was. To some this is certainly the cause of neuronal affliction. They
know that the ‘most influential artwork of the twentieth century’ can be just another
object simply by placing it in the bathroom of the gallery. Their decision that it is artwork
does nothing to solidify the possibilities for this object.

Too much
Neuronal pain does not come from the impossible, but the too possible. The possibilities
of Fountain serve as a wonderful point of reference for discussing neuronal affliction
because of its relatively simplistic problematic: is it, or is it not, art? The answer, of
course, is yes. Both possible answers are equally valid. To mince the words of Joyce
Cheng, the urinal “can be understood as sculpture but not only as such” (Cheng 276).31
There is too much possible to be actual. The multiple neuronal connections were
untenable in the context of New York in 1917. “From the time of the Armory Show,”
Naumann notes, “most objects open to double readings were met with bewilderment by
the American critics” (New York Dada 183). This inability to conceive of multiple,
coexisting possibilities was also expressed contemporaneously by American artist Louise
Norton, friend and collaborator of Duchamp’s.
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Dreier, at this time, likely did not know Duchamp was behind Fountain. Duchamp was
quite secretive about his role in submitting Fountain until its resurgence decades later.
31
Here, Cheng is actually speaking to the performances and objects of Zurich Dada.
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In her article “Buddha of the Bathroom,” Norton ruminates with frustration and
mockery over the ability to conceive of people as multiples but not objects, “although a
man [may] marry he can never be only a husband […] But with objects and ideas it is
different. Recently we have had a chance to observe their meticulous monogamy”
(“Buddha of the Bathroom” 154). Norton’s use of ‘monogamy’ is in reference to an
‘irrevocably associated’ understanding of a urinal’s utilitarian function. Hence, Fountain
was largely incomprehensible as two concurrent, separate things. The immunological
mentality of the American public was unable to accept the inclusive sameness within the
urinal and the artwork. Han would call this the ‘inferno of the same,’ in which the Other
has been replaced by mere difference. Fountain’s double reading as both art and object
dissolved the threshold between the two. Instead, they are only two different readings of
the same thing. To the public at this time the physical object, being singular, should have
a single designation.
Duchamp’s ‘figuration of a possible’ lacks the destruction of immunological
impossibility, creating a mental space where contradictory possibilities are preserved and
can be ‘retrieved under the right circumstances,’ just as the nomination of art is retrieved
from other possible nominations for an object when an artist places said object into a
gallery. Positive, neuronal possibility is then unsurprisingly, psychic, virtual and
disconnected from immunological conflict as embodied by the impossible.

Possibilism
What afflicts us, then, within art, is the interpretive problem of whether the readymade is,
or is not, art. Duchamp exposes this problem for what it often is, fashion. The possibility
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of a urinal, or vista, or nude being art is always present—was always present—but
mediated by the hand. Duchamp’s witty intervention was to show the decision at its most
fundamental, pivoting on the choice of the artist. Rather than using the skilled hand of the
artist to conceal his artistic choices, Duchamp exposed the fundamental process of artistic
creation and, arguably, the creation of meaning itself. This made extraordinarily clear the
possibilities of his readymades and objects in general. “Duchamp’s new artistic
techniques resulted from an aesthetic concept which was based primarily on
‘possibilism.’ It was neither likeness and truth, as observed by all the various brands of
realism, nor beauty, harmony, and balance, the essence of all formalist aesthetics, which
were central to these techniques, but ‘the possible’” (Molderings 19). Consequently,
anything can be art after the readymade. Though, the question Duchamp posed to his
spectators was not “can it be art?”, but “should it be art.” In this way, the production of
possibilities, of what can be, burns away the preconceived notions of taste. It is caustic to
aesthetics.
Herbert Molderings believes that Duchamp came to this new possibility-focused
technique through studying the work of late nineteenth century polymath, Henri Poincaré.
Poincaré had developed a neo-positivist notion of mathematics connected to
conventionalism, the philosophical belief that fundamental principles come from
agreement rather than external factors. “In radicalizing Poincaré’s conventionalist
arguments, Duchamp arrives at the nominalist conclusion that all axioms, principles, and
laws are the inventions and constructs of scientists and do not reflect the ‘true essence’ of
reality but constitute constantly changing ‘truths’ ” (Molderings 19). Duchamp’s use of
Poincaré’s conventionalism leads him, following Molderings’ argument, to challenge
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many of the preconceptions in art at the beginning of the twentieth century. This is useful
for investigating Han’s neuronal affliction because it sheds light on a particular side of
the problem not explored by Han.
Specifically, Duchampian possibility is significant for understanding the neuronal
as detached from opposition, in terms of contrast and antithesis. He does not offer what
is, but what could be. In this way, Duchamp also offers us an understanding of how
neuronal affliction occurs by applying immunological optics to neuronal systems.
Duchamp positions his artworks’ challenge so that the conflict he inspires is not with the
Other, but between internal contradictions and assumptions. Today, we see this in Han’s
achievement-subjects. They work themselves to death, to an extent literally, exhausted by
a shift from ‘subject’ to ‘project.’ That is to say, “The late-modern achievement-subject is
subject to no one. In fact, it is no longer a subject in the etymological sense (subject to,
sujet à). It positivizes itself; indeed, it liberates itself into a project.” The project works
on itself, but “the project turns out to be a projectile that the achievement-subject is
aiming at itself,” one achievement at a time (The Burnout Society 46–7). Though,
approaching neuronal affliction through Duchamp’s possibilism, Han’s ‘project’ as a
“figure of constraint” fails to meet the terms of their own suffering, that of the too much
(In the Swarm 48). Today’s stress, depression, hyperactivity, burnout—its neuronal
affliction—in my view, is the product of our knowledge of sheer possibilities mingled
with the scientific mindset that these outcomes can be predicted and optimized. In other
words, the ‘achieving project’ is aware of what it can do, yet, for one reason or another,
is unable to do them all. Thus, satisfaction, relaxation, and self-value are perpetually just
out of reach on the other side of the gap so full of possibility.
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Duchamp’s interest in the purely positive possible begins to draw attention to the
problems of excess and Otherlessness established by Han. Duchamp’s ‘nominalist and
historicist way of thinking’ expounds on this by showing that the possibility of what can
be called art is vast, maybe infinite, highlighted by his famous line, “I like living,
breathing better than working... my art is that of living” (Cabanne 72). This expansive
definition is itself a figuration of the problem. The problem exists in the plurality of
possibilities that unfurl in the wake of this profound shift away from art as an externally
defined entity in the form of painting and sculpture; Duchamp’s nominalist approach
toward art saw past the limits of the artist’s hand necessarily being involved in the
production of artworks. Simultaneously, Duchamp’s ‘art of living’ appears to escape the
problems Han describes for two reasons. He was still very clearly pushing against
thresholds that have since disappeared. And, as the naïve absurdity of his statement
points to, Duchamp approached his art with a sense of playfulness that appears to have
kept depression and burnout at bay. Producing new ideas and perspectives, mental
adventures if you will, took priority in Duchamp’s work rather than investigations of
metaphysics and ‘truth,’ such as his contemporaries, especially outside of Dada. A degree
of seriousness seems to have also been washed away with our move toward discovery
and possibility. This Dadaist approach to neuronal affliction escapes some of the
bleakness found in Han’s descriptions. For Han, we are doomed to our contemporary
depression and burnout. Though, looking back on Dada’s early expressions of neuronal
affliction, we do not find a refusal or negativity but an abundance of options, possibilities
and playfulness.
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Conclusion
In this thesis I have brought together Dada and Byung-Chul Han’s concept of affliction in
order to understand why we might be facing a crisis of fantasy that is affecting the arts
and, consequently, society in general. The similarities between Han and Dada are
surprisingly abundant, the majority of which I have not had time or space to address here.
The relationship between Han and Dada suggests that Dada has a central position in
understanding why and how we experience pain in modern and contemporary culture, but
also identifies base assumptions we make about the world and its workings. Importantly,
Dada’s unique historical position, which imbues it with both immunological and neuronal
features, suggests that Dada contains answers or at least alternatives for how this new
neuronal age might be able to live with its affliction of too many possibilities, too much
to do, too much to see and the depression of never being able to achieve it all. Such an
abundance creates infarctions—clots—that restrict access to an elusive somewhere else.
This is why a suggestion made by Amelia Jones has caught my attention; it is
through elision that the avant-garde is able to radically change culture without necessarily
falling into the immunological trap of opposition and conflict. In Irrational Modernism:
A Neurasthenic History of New York Dada Jones asks, if the militaristic term ‘avantgarde’ presents artists as “the soldiers at the front of culture […] how can an artist
identified as a soldier fighting on behalf of radical aesthetic intervention be reconciled
with the figure of the evader or noncombatant escaping the war and staying, in the most
cowardly fashion, at the home front?” Her answer: “Primarily through elision” (Jones
57–8).
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Elision is a slurring of the rough spaces between words and ideas. It is the
omission as well as the merger of thoughts that occur between other thoughts. The elision
of sounds in speech amounts to contractions that are not so much exclusionary as a
flattening and smoothing out of details for the sake of speed and comfort. Its
etymological root, elidere, literally means to ‘crush out.’ Elision occurs because there is
too much. It is excessively positive and for this reason is a surprisingly apt way to
describe what has appeared in this thesis.
Dada’s expression of neuronal affliction almost a century before Polly
Matzinger’s paper arguing for its own kind of elision of friendly and dangerous cells
disrupts Han’s paradoxically dualist depiction. Their collage, readymades, sound poetry,
mechanomorphs, and interest in the merger of art and life are methods of crushing out the
distance between images, objects, voices, words, and bodies. In these Dadaist techniques
things begin to overlap, contract and merge with one another. Tzara’s sound poetry,
Ernst’s collages and Duchamp’s signifiers are so full they feel as though meaning is
being pushed out through their seams. These works leave a sense of uneasiness, which
after thinking about them in relation to Han’s theory of neuronal affliction has led me to
believe this is not because their elision is leaving things out. Their omission is, if
anything, traditional. Their uneasiness lies in the way elision merges their disparate
pieces together. These methods manifest and draw attention to excess and a societal and
technological drive for speed and rationality, key features of the neuronal.
Elision does not simply omit. It is a moment in speech or a ‘curation’ of ideas that
is continually reworked with a desubjectified subjectivity, something Han repeatedly
calls for in his writing. Here I am specifically thinking of playfulness. The compression
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of words into contractions or the selective choice of moments to compose a history or
narrative invites a particular approach that is not best found by logic, but something more
transient. Elision’s contractions are not permanent, but fleeting, perhaps habitual, but not
wholly destructive. Moments of omission can be replayed. This is what has stood out to
me as Dada’s unique contribution to understanding neuronal affliction. They are
unrelentingly playful. Comparatively, Han’s burnt out achievement-subjects of the latemodern period appear to have lost their ability to play.
Eugen Fink, in his essay Oasis of Happiness: Toward an Ontology of Play,
describes play as something that is meant to “function as an occasional interruption”
(Fink 19). When the original German edition of this essay was published in 1960 play
was described as something “thought of more or less as a frivolous and pleasurable
nonsense, as a carefree sojourn in the airy realm of phantasy and sheer potentialities, as
an escape from unyielding reality to a dream utopia” (Fink 19). If ‘unyielding reality’
does not describe the atmosphere during WWI as well as today’s concerns of late
capitalism then I have grossly misunderstood these situations. Escaping into ‘pleasurable
nonsense’ was, and to an extent still is, seen as the privilege of children, although the
Dadaists boldly used nonsense in their critiques of society and culture, usually treating
them with a measure of humour (because what else do you do at the end of the world?).
Importantly, a feature of play is its lack of obligation, which allows for the spontaneous,
uninhibited behaviour of playfulness. The knot of social constructions that usually
surround us in the real world loosen during play to be replaced by the rules of play. As
Fink notes, “play is characterized by a calm, timeless, ‘presence’ and autonomous, selfsufficient meaning” (Fink 21). In this way, play’s activity and creativity seem meditative,
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allowing new thoughts and approaches to bubble up spontaneously as the autonomous
and self-sufficient nature of play does not require a consistency. Play is free to explore
new and unpredictable futures without an obligation to past, present or future situations.
For this reason, play is uninhibited and unrestrained, free to explore all the possibilities
afforded by imagination while remaining in the present moment and ‘tired’ fantasy. This
should sound strikingly similar to the ‘tired vision’ described in the second chapter,
allowing for a ‘long and slow gaze’ that indifferently, but not disinterestedly, observes
the world. Both create a buffer around the world for contemplation, whether it be purely
mental or more embodied. From this slow process of ‘looking’ we can use a
(inter)neuronal optics to learn and appreciate the ‘fantasy’ of the world.
The integration of the dangerous Other into the safety of the Self has been a
momentous turn in our relationship with the world, which does not necessarily have to be
described within ‘play,’ but certainly bears some merit when we consider Han’s
suggestion that this transition occurred with Polly Matzinger’s work and not with Dada.
In Matzinger’s work in immunology this marked an important shift in understanding
biology and the inter-workings of nature. Different parts of a cell can experience the
same situation in radically different ways, finding something as fundamental to life as
water both dangerous and necessary. Han used this term in immunology to support his
idea that “the Cold War ended precisely as this paradigm shift was taking place” and “it
is marked by the disappearance of otherness and foreignness” (The Burnout Society 2).
Though, his presentation is overly-simplistic and purposely provocative. The Other has
not simply disappeared. Instead, it has been absorbed into the Self, creating a hybrid
identity that is both safe and dangerous. The Self is now just as alienating as it is
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comforting, which produces a problem: how do we relax, breathe and take a step back
from the things that threaten us, as well as the things that please us, to contemplate and
appreciate them in order to imagine possibilities for where we go next?
While in play we are able to hold two worlds or interpretations simultaneously,
similar to the way Duchamp does with his readymades. Within an immunological context
these two worlds would destroy each other, but a curious, (inter)neuronal optics
maintains permeable walls between. This is simply because the play world is intricately
interwoven with the real world. This is an unavoidably important part of artistic practice
that is easily overlooked by art historians and theorists unfamiliar with a creative process
that intersects with materials. In Flight out of Time Hugo Ball describes the significance
of material as it seeds the human with possibilities (and not the other way around),
We were all there when Janco arrived with his masks, and everyone immediately
put one on. Then something strange happened. Not only did the mask
immediately call for costume; it also demanded a quite definite, passionate
gesture, bordering on madness. Although we could not have imagined it five
minutes earlier, we were walking around with the most bizarre movements,
festooned and draped with impossible objects, each one of us trying to outdo the
other in inventiveness. (Ball 64)
In this way, the fantasies of play do not overwrite or destroy the real world. Instead it
embellishes it, often drawing in more engagement from other people, promoting
unpredictable outcomes or ‘carefree sojourns in the airy realm of phantasy and sheer
potentialities.’ It should not go unnoticed, too, that “in the period that saw the rise of the
Dada movement, the historian Johan Huizinga and literary critic Walter Benjamin were
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particularly advanced in responding to the crisis of interwar European culture and politics
with a new anthropology based on the notion of play” (Cheng 276). Huizinga, the
legendary play scholar, was unravelling the ‘play-element’ at work within culture and
Benjamin was building upon Baudelaire’s philosophy of toys. Homo ludens, as it were,
were becoming a significant point of research during the most clearly identifiable periods
of conflict in human history. This adds credence to play, in which, unlike the fantasies of
the Other, such as schizophrenic experiences—those who have lost all contact with the
real world in favour of the fictional realm of imagination—the player layers the two
worlds in a way that the play world develops from the real world and then infuses it with
new potentialities. The overlapping but separate worlds of play and reality seem
incredibly appropriate here. As the fantasy of play is fed by real world objects and
contexts, play distances itself from its real world roots: plastic cups become police hats,
fallen sticks become wands, and beds become ships at sea or vital islands of relief from
oceans of lava. Of course, this is a purposeful reference to the observations of Han, Crary
and Handke that sleep is perhaps the last threshold we have in the neuronal age. But is the
tiredness Handke describes not a low-energy kind of play? If we can tease out a space
between hyperactive work and complete exhaustion, is that not when we make fantastic
dinners and see the glimmer of everyday things that owes some of its shine to something
other than light? This hardly seems to be the collapse of the Other into the Self that I
described in the first chapter, but it does rely on an interweaving of the two that Han’s
immunological framework does not quite describe. The real world provides the player
with fodder to distort and adapt in playful behaviour, which then in turn seeds the real
world with new ways of being. Although a number of the Dadaists had diagnosed mental
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illnesses or questionable mental health, their actions, artworks and observations cannot be
brushed aside as the ravings of lunatics, as tended to be the case before the 1950s and 60s
within artistic circles and the 1970s in more academic spheres. It is because of their
playfulness, their two-worldliness, that I believe the Dadaists were so inventive,
influential and neuronal.
Dada’s playfulness represents a turn away from a logic extending all the way back
through the Enlightenment to the Renaissance, which placed human reason at the centre
of reality. Hans Arp wrote in “Dadaland,” “the Renaissance taught men the haughty
exaltation of their reason. Modern times, with their science and technology, dedicated
them to megalomania. The confusion of our epoch is the result of this overestimation of
reason” (Arp quoted in Sheppard, Modernism 179). The sentiment of this statement
emphasizes the Dadaists’ push toward irrationalism, away from the ‘overestimation of
reason’. In my view, this is an understanding that resisting the change is unhelpful and,
ultimately, exhausting—better to use the momentum of reason’s failures in order to move
through to somewhere else. Although I believe reinstating negativity, as Han suggests,
would be a step toward a healthy sense of fantasy and the cultivation of a ‘somewhere
else,’ excess positivity in our technological, sociological and ontological trajectories is
our current context. Attempting to reinstate negativity is regressive and wishful thinking.
To carry forward, it is easiest to go with the flow, as it were.
Steven Shaviro has suggested in his development of an accelerationist aesthetics
that in order to escape the seemingly inescapable grip of neoliberal capitalism we must go
through, which we find mimicked by Tzara when he argues “Dada is the signboard of
abstraction; advertising and business are also elements of poetry” (Tzara 38). By
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doubling down on our accelerating situation of excess positivity, we can produce
otherwise unimaginable possibilities. Possibilities that remain hidden due to the blinders
of immunological optics presuming there are thresholds which external forces are
pushing against. Resisting the advances of capitalism only serves to feed it more
commodities for it to sell back to us. As Han says, the issues we face in the neuronal age
“elude all technologies and techniques that seek to combat what is alien” (The Burnout
Society 1).
The afflictions Han identifies for the neuronal age (burnout, depression,
hyperactivity) are produced without threat, that is, without risk of injury from external
forces. Instead, neuronal affliction is produced by disappointment with our own failures
to achieve all that we wish we were. The crisis of climate change I think weighs on us the
way it does because, first, it appears that we are the sole cause and, secondly, because we
believe we should be better than that. Judging from my research, the Dadaists felt the
same way about the devastation of World War I. In this way, Han’s claim that we are
facing a ‘crisis of fantasy’ seems not to be a crisis at all, but a poverty in perception. As
Shaviro says in his book, No Speed Limit (2015), the ‘crisis’ we experience today does
not follow from the traditional use of the term. “We continually find ourselves in what we
might well call a crisis,” but whatever we are experiencing does not bear the same
immediacy. “A crisis,” he tells us, “is a turning point, a sudden rupture, a sharp and
immediate moment of reckoning.” If we think back to Han’s concept of injuring beauty,
the sudden rupture of crisis is clearly an immunological affair. “But for us today, a crisis
has been a chronic and seemingly permanent condition.” This new sense of crises “never
come to a culmination; instead, they are endlessly and indefinitely deferred” (9). This is
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clearly a neuronal affliction in which our primary experience is not a ‘sudden rupture’ but
an overwhelming, prolonged sense of bad faith. The ‘crisis’ Shaviro describes then, is not
one of negativity but positivity, something which requires entirely new techniques, not to
combat, but to work with.
Dada has, at minimum, supplied initial language for expressing neuronal
affliction, but it may hold more clues. One of which is an encouragement of tiredness and
the cultivation of rest in a broad sense, which promotes possibilism and an accelerating of
objects (their meaning, not necessarily their quantity). Developing tiredness over our
current neuronal affliction of exhaustion encourages a playfulness that would
undoubtedly break up the perpetual sense of crisis. Crucially, this is not a resistance to an
accelerating world but a layering of possible alternatives. Drawing the Self and Other
together through the lens of play fosters a way of seeing the world and understanding its
complex relations that makes things “flicker, twinkle, and vibrate at the edges.” It is
immediately apparent in the artwork and activities of Dada that this is not a twinkling of
fairy dust, but something closer to the ‘convulsion’ André Breton attributed to beauty.
The question, then, that I find myself asking of our neuronal age is: For all our
entertainment, games and interactivity, are we really playing?
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